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IINTRODUCTION
To many historians a philosophy of history is an object of inquiry
rather than a useful system of thought. Today T s social scientists do not pre-
tend that knowledge concerning man can be systematized into a philosophy. The
leap from the specific to the general is too great. The physiological psycholo-
gist — the epitome of the social scientist — shows great reluctance to generalize
from his specific laboratory findings. Many historians, also imagining them-
selves to be social scientists, have conjured up a host of reasons to avoid gen-
eralization.
One victim of this trend has been the respectability of "philosophy of
history," with the grandiose statements implied by "philosophy." A student of
this subject has written that the "ordinary professional historian is usually a
practicing positivist. If he has a philosophy of history, he feels uneasy about
it, particularly in the presence of his colleagues." *
At the same time that philosophies of history are denied, "meaning" in
history — if considered at all — is concentrated upon particular events or time
periods, rather than applied to the whole of history. However, as Hans
Meyerhoff has pointed out, 2 there has been, in the last thirty or forty years,
1E. Harris Harbison, Christianity and History (Princeton, 1964), p. 45.
2Hans Meyerhoff, ed. , The Philosophy of History in Our Time: An Anthology
(New York, 1959), pp. 21-24.
2a renewal of interest among theologians in the "meaning" in (and of) history.
This concern with meaning, in the sense that a philosophy of history is implied,
has not generally been accepted by historians. Herbert Butterfield, in
Christianity and History, ° stands as an exception. As a result of the failure
among historians to concern themselves with the overall meaning and philo-
sophical implications of their subject, the discussion of philosophy of history
has been centered primarily among philosophers — who usually approach history
from the presuppositions of philosophical idealism, or naturalism — and theo-
logians.
The theologians of the last forty years whose interest in history has
resulted in significant contributions to the problem of meaning in history include
Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Rudolf Bultmann, Jacques Maritain, Anders Nygren,
4
Friedrich Gogarten, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr*
The philosopher -theologian Karl Lowith has also made a heavy contribution to
this field. 5
Of these writers, and many others, Reinhold Niebuhr has had the great-
est impact in America. Niebuhr, whose first article appeared in 1916, has
3Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History (New York, 1949).
4For the background of this movement see E. Harris Harbison, Christianity
and History
,
chapter two; and James M. Connolly, Human History and the
Word of God: The Christian Me aning of History in Contemporary Thought
(New York, 1965).
5
Karl Lowith's most widely known work is Meaning in History (Chicago, 1949).
3demonstrated over the past fifty years an intense interest in the meaning of
history. His theology is unintelligible without a consideration of his philosophy
of history; neither can his philosophy of history be intelligently discussed with-
out an understanding of his theology. This is not an exceptional fact: the
interest of theologians in history has prompted the use of the term "theology
of history" in place of "philosophy of history. " In spite of the differing termi-
nology, the subject-matter remains the same. The difference is that
theological rather than idealistic or naturalistic presuppositions are used in
the formation of a philosophy of history.
We will not need to concern ourselves extensively with Niebuhr T s theol-
ogy, except as it relates to his philosophy of history. Nor shall we attempt a
comprehensive examination of his philosophy of history. The former problem
has been adequately treated by several scholars, 6 and the latter is beyond the
scope of this paper. The work that has previously been done on Niebuhr T s
philosophy of history has tended to view the subject as a whole; it is the purpose
of this paper to show the development of Niebuhr T s thinking on history up to the
publication in 1937 of his first major book on philosophy of history, Beyond
Tragedy: Essays on the Christian Interpretation of History . ' In Beyond
Tragedy, many of the ideas which he had presented in more random fashion
over the past fifteen years were brought together and systematically elaborated
6Two excellent studies ace Hans Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr ,
trans, by Louise Pettibone Smith (New York, 1956), and Gordon Harland,
The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York, 1960).
^Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian Interpretation of
History (New York, 1937).
in fifteen "sermonic essays. u Niebuhr delivered the Gifford Lectures in
Edinburgh in the spring and fall of 1939, and published them in two volumes as
The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation
, in 1941 and 1943. 8
The second volume, Human Destiny
,
is especially important as a systematic
presentation of Niebuhr T s philosophy of history. And the most comprehensive
and systematic statement of Niebuhr 1 s philosophy of history was published in
1949 as Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of
9
History . One further volume which is especially significant for Niebuhr's
interpretation of history is The Self and the Dramas of History
,
published in
1955.
These important works, beginning with Beyond Tragedy , form the basis
for most analyses of Niebuhr T s philosophy of history. What does not seem to be
equally understood is the fact that Niebuhr 1 s philosophy of history did not sud-
denly emerge in Beyond Tragedy (or in Human Destiny ) but was the product of
over a dozen years of development. An analysis of Niebuhr T s publications up to
1937 provides evidence for the hypothesis that the formation of the basic ideas
in Niebuhr 1 s vision of history took place well before their systematic presenta-
tion as a philosophy of history.
8
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation
(2 vols. ; New York, 1941 and 1943). The edition cited in this paper is that of
1964, and the volumes will hereafter be referred to as Human Nature (vol. 1)
and Human Destiny (vol. 2).
9Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern
Views (New York, 1949). Cf. Nathan Scott, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhr
(Minneapolis, 1963), p. 38.
5II
THE 1920 T S (PART 1 )
It becomes apparent, after some study, that what is essential in
Niebuhr T s writing is more convincingly put forth in his books than in his
articles. Nevertheless, we do find occasional shorter pieces which express
an argument in such a way that the less concentrated presentation in the longer
works is illuminated. In addition to this initial importance of the articles,
they are also valuable in some cases for showing a development of ideas in
Niebuhr's philosophy of history.
1^
Between 1915 and 1928, Niebuhr served as pastor for a rapidly growing
church in the automotive boom-town of Detroit. From Detroit he took a post at
the Union Theological Seminary, where he has remained for the rest of his life.
It is easy to attribute to his early publications from Detroit a presci-
ence of his later thought. We can trace the earlier, more amorphous thinking
but we must guard against reading conclusions of the 1930 T s back into the
tentative statements of the 1920 T s.
Though we are aware of this danger, there are several elements of the
later thought which clearly emerge in certain of Niebuhr T s early articles in
10
Cf . Georgette Vignaux, La Theologie de THistoire chez Reinhold Niebuhr .
(Paris, 1956), p. 7.
The Christian Century and The Atlantic Monthly
. As early as 1922, for
example, Niebuhr spoke of the "sin of modern society. M 11 Though in this
case he meant that the economic struggle was unfairly conducted, the fact that
he applied the word "sin" to society as a whole anticipates his later emphasis
upon original sin, and is indicative of the entire Neo-Orthodox movement in
theology (in which Niebuhr was in the foreground) which stressed the sin of
1 9
man.
There are two further points in this early article, from 1922, which
point to elements in Niebuhr 1 s mature thought closely connected to his philoso-
phy of history. The first is his reference to the "inevitability" of economic
conflict. 13 it is not the fact of economic conflict that is significant so much
as the use of the word "inevitability. " This word is generally employed by
one who has accepted the existence of at least one absolute. A thorough-going
relativist would hesitate to call any future event inevitable, because he would
have presupposed no "given" by which he could judge the course of history.
Throughout fifty years of writing, Niebuhr has had no compunctions about
designating an event "inevitable." The fact that, in 1922, he saw "economic
conflict" as inevitable (as did many people) should not permit us to forget that
n
"The Church and the Middle Class," The Christian Century , 39 (Dec. 7, 1922),
1514.
12
Karl Barth, who initiated much of the thinking of Neo -Ortho doxy, published his
seminal work, The Epistle to the Romans , in 1918. Though Niebuhr was among
the first Americans to recognize this essentially European movement, there is
no evidence to suggest his awareness before the middle or late 1920 f s.
13
"The Church and the Middle Class, " o£_. cit_.
7it is but a short step from interpreting a force in history as inevitable, to
calling the course of history inevitable — as he was later to do.*^
The second point, perhaps a semantic one, is Niebuhr ! s use in this
article of the words "prophetic" and "prophet." He referred not only to his
view of the economic situation as necessarily "prophetic," but also to his own
role as that of a "prophet. " Either we may dismiss these words as the hubris
of a young minister, or we may read back into them the aura of his later
philosophy of history. His later views certainly became prophetic — even
apocalyptic — and he is often referred to as a "prophet." Whether or not
this is significant, the point we may make is this: while the content of the
later philosophy of history was not expressed in 1922, some of the words
were — sin, conflict, inevitable, prophetic.
The youthfulness of this early article is also evident, for at one point
Niebuhr spoke of finding "a way of abolishing the conflict. " 15 Though he had
earlier spoken of the inevitability of conflict, Niebuhr, in 1922, was still
sufficiently imbued with the Social Gospel and pragmatism to speak of abolish-
ing conflict. This type of thinking on "conflict" was to disappear completely
from his thought by the time of the Depression.
Cf. Beyond Tragedy
, pp. 30, 45; and Human Destiny , pp. 319-321.
"The Church and the Middle Class, " o£. cit.
In 1925, writing in The Atlantic Monthly
, Niebuhr again expressed
several of the ingredients of his later philosophy, though in a less incisively
1 fi
worded form. D One especially significant statement was his plea for a
"spiritual appreciation of human life. " 1? In this case he was speaking of a
"social morality" with spiritual underpinnings, but he threw the force of this
argument against "the hostility of nature. " He then emphasized that the cruel-
ty which man inflicted on his fellow men (owing to "their mutual fear and their
greed") was greater than that "from the hostility of the natural world." 18
If we tie these statements together we have an important part of
Niebuhr T s later philosophy of history. On the one hand he argued that man
could not confront a hostile natural world without spiritual assistance. Man
was not capable, as a finite creature, of resisting the temptation and hostility
of the natural world. The reason that man himself was not simply a "finite"
creature, but rather finite with the capacity to conceive the infinite, was not
explained in 1925. But the presupposition that man is somehow in need of
spiritual sustenance against the finite world does hint toward a later develop-
ment of Niebuhr T s thought. At this stage we can merely note that Niebuhr did
not consign man to the world of nature, and thus his view of human history is
one that must include elements other than the naturalistic.
16
"Can Christianity Survive?" The Atlantic Monthly , 135 (January, 1925),
84-88.
17 Ibid.
,
86.
18 Ibid.
Closely related to this separation of man from nature, and the conse-
quent need for supernatural balm, is the warning that man inflicts upon himself
the most grievous of injuries. There is a definite suggestion that man's
capacity for evil is at least as great as his capacity for good. In speaking of
the operation of human institutions, Niebuhr noted that liberal views of man's
nature fail "to understand how evil essentially good men can be." 19 As in the
case of man's confrontation with nature, spiritual help is the answer to the
evil in man. When Niebuhr wrote that "nothing less than a transcendentally
oriented religion is equal to this task, " 20 he made reference to both the prob-
lem of man's finiteness within nature, and to the consequence of this finiteness
between men — the existence of evil. An article later in the year made the
same arguments concerning man's imperfection, and the need to alleviate this
through the "grace of forgiveness, " the strength for which "requires a high
21degree of spiritual passion and imagination.
"
These arguments, as they relate to Niebuhr's philosophy of history,
should not be made too strongly. Though the suggestions are there, they are
not elaborated nor are they worded as incisively as they came to be over the
next decade and one-half. In 1925 he wrote of man's sins against other men,
but he did not develop this thought into a doctrine of "original sin. " (In fact,
19
Ibid.
,
88
Ibid.
21
"Germany and Modern Civilization," The Atlantic Monthly 135 (June, 1925),
847.
10
Niebuhr f s later doctrine of original sin involved man's relationship with God
rather than man's relations with other men. 22 ) He did suggest that spiritual
aid, in the form of the "grace of forgiveness, " was needed in human relations
In a similar manner, man's confrontation with nature was in need of super-
natural guidance.
The important elements in these early thoughts from 1925 are the evil
of man, the finiteness of man, the inability of man to solve his problems by
himself, and his resulting spiritual need. It will later become more obvious
that Niebuhr's philosophy of history exhibits a distrust of man's reason, an
acceptance of the reality and permanence of human evil (with the implied
finiteness of man), 2 ^ and the reality of God in history. 24
In 1927 Niebuhr published his first book, Does Civilization Need
Religion? A Study in the Social Resources and Limitations of Religion in
Modern Life . ° In it are contained many of the conclusions about religion
and civilization that Niebuhr reached in the decade following the First World
22Cf. Beyond Tragedy
, pp. 27-30
23Donald B. Meyer has written that Niebuhr did not argue the doctrine of
original sin until 1935, in An Interpretation of Christian Ethics . (The
Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919-1941 /Berkeley, 1960/ ,p. 244.)
But a large amount of evidence is available to show that Niebuhr, in the 1920' s,
was intrigued with human evil.
24These points, as expressed by 1934, are elaborated below in chapter V.
25Reinhold Niebuhr, Does Civilization Need Religion? A Study in the Social
Resources and Limitations of Religion in Modern Life (New York, 1927).
War. He also elaborated for the first time some of his still tentative thoughts
about man and history. Although he had not yet turned his theology toward a
study of history and its meaning, he did make use of history to illuminate the
problems of religion and civilization. In this sense, many of the statements
in this book are a mirror-image of much of his later philosophy of history.
Throughout the book there is a complaint that religion had lost its
significance for modern civilization. 26 Yet there is the equally pervasive
argument that man is in need of religion:
Whatever may be said of specific religions and
religious forms, it is difficult to imagine man
without religion; for religion is the champion of
personality in a seemingly impersonal world.^
The argument in favor of religion was directed toward the needs of man and
his civilization. Later Niebuhr was to extend — or perhaps synthesize — his
concern for man and his culture into a consideration of human history. In
much the same way that he saw religion as the Mchampion of personality" for
man, and a bulwark against an "impersonal world, " the insights of religion
were to serve the same purposes for history. Religion was to give history its
"personality," or its "meaning, " and religion was to function as the final
oo
salvation at the end of history in the "impersonal world."* 0
26Cf. Does Civilization Need Religion?, pp. 3, 17, 220, 231-232,
27
Ibid.
,
p. 4.
28
Cf. Beyond Tragedy
, p. 302; and Human Destiny , pp. 287-288.
All of the argument in this early book was not, however, directed
toward man. For the first time Niebuhr spoke of a "religious interpretation
of the world. M The relevance of religion to the sweep of history was supported
by an argument that he was to continue to use in his theological view of history:
A religions ideal is always a little absurd because
it insists on the truth of what ought to be true but
is only partly true; it is however the ultimate wisdom
because reality slowly approaches the ideals which are
implicit in its life.^9
The religious interpretation of the world is essentially
an insistence that the ideal is real and that the real can
be understood only in the light of the ideal. 30
What Niebuhr was saying here, in 1927, and what was to become the essence
of his later philosophy of history, is that the realities of history could be fully
comprehended "only in the light of the ideal." The "ideal" was the absurdity,
the irrationality of religion — the "ultimate wisdom."
The form of argument is that for which Niebuhr is well-known — and
much criticized — paradox. The fact that an absurdity gives meaning whereas
the force of reason remains helpless is a paradox. At this point there may be
a tendency to dismiss Niebuhr's views on history as, if not sophistical, at
least irrelevant. One student of Niebuhr T s philosophy of history has argued
that it would be more proper to speak of his "theology of history. " 31 The
^Does Civilization Need Religion?
,
pp. 44-45.
3Q
Ibid.
,
p. 46.
Georgette Vignaux, La Theologie de I'Histoire chez Reinhold Niebuhr , pp. 5,
27. Robert L. Cal&oun saw fit to label the second volume of The Nature and
Destiny of Man as "a theological interpretation of history. " (The Journal of
Religion, 24 /January, 1944/, 59.)
reason given for the inadequacy of the term "philosophy" of history is that
philosophy presupposes rationality, and, according to Niebuhr, history cannot
be fully comprehended in rational terms. Therefore, a "theology" of history
is a more adequate description of a theory that relies on paradox and the
supernatural.
The whole problem of philosophy versus theology is beyond the scope
of this paper. Although it is true that a theology negates an insistence upon
reason, philosophy may do the same. Even a philosophy which is based upon
reason gives no guarantee that its presupposition — reason — is not itself an
irrational posit. Without extending this line of argument, I will assume for
our purposes the interchangeability of the terms philosophy and theology in
relation to interpretations of history. For the sake of clarity, I will speak
only of Niebuhr T s "philosophy" of history, with the understanding that the pre-
suppositions remain theological.
±±
The introduction of paradox into his argument is perhaps the most
significant step taken in Does Civilization Need Religion? , but there are
several other important ingredients to Niebuhr f s philosophy of history in this
book.
One reason for Niebuhr T s use of paradox is that it allows a degree of
movement between an insistence upon both the relativity of human decisions
and the absolute ideal under which those decisions supposedly are made. In
14
1935 he was to speak of the Mrelevance of an impossible ethical ideal, M 32 and
in 1927 he used the same type of argument. In this case he insisted upon the
difficulty of absolutizing religious ethics on account of the relativities of his-
tory; yet the temptation to dogmatize remained strong due to the feeling that
we are in possession of an absolute set of ethics. 33 Turning this argument
around, we see the manner in which Niebuhr was to attack those who absolut-
ized their own vision of history from a naturalistic or a rationalistic basis. 3^
These latter visions, by definition, remained within the "relativities of history"
and were thus guilty of judging history from a point in time within history.
Niebuhr posited his irrational absolute outside of history — in 1927 in connec-
tion with ethics — and could therefore speak of an interpretation of history that
was not influenced by the relativities of history.
This point is clearly stated — in mirror-image — in the following
passage:
The moral effectiveness of religion depends upon
its ability to detach itself from the historical
relativities with which its ideals are inevitability
compounded in the course of history. °°
This sentence suggests Niebuhr T s desire — in 1927 directed toward religion —
that a vision of history not be immersed in the relativities of history, but
rather stand above history with untarnished ideals. However unsatisfactory
32An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York, 1935; Cleveland, 1956),
chapter 4.
33Does Civili zation Need Religion? , pp. 221-222.
34The most concentrated body of Niebuhr T s criticism of "modern" philosophies
of history is contained in Faith and History, chapters 2-5.
35Does Civilization Need Religion?, p. 222.
this line of reasoning may be to a rationalist, it does have the advantage cf
pretending to hold knowledge with an authority beyond that of human ability.
That Niebuhr calls such knowledge the "ultimate wisdom" is a logical step.
That he should be accused of hiding behind paradox is also logical, but only
if his initial presupposition of the limitations of human reason is not granted.
In any case, the form of argument is indeed that of paradox.
The quotation given above, as applied to history, is not to be construed
as a too liberal reading of Niebuhr f s intent. In 1927 he was fully prepared to
relate history (as well as ethics) with God:
Though God works his will against the inertia of the
concrete world and the waywardness of man, neither
science nor history justifies the conclusion that his
resources are not ultimately equal to the creative
task. The intractableness of the world makes the
creative and redemptive struggle real but not hope-
less. 36
The contention is explicit that God is a force in history. The argument is not
made through positive empirical means, but rather through the negative reason-
ing that a supernatural force cannot be disproved. The counter -argument, that
man is a force unto himself, is answered by Niebuhr with the accusation that it
is pride alone that causes man to envision himself as unique in the "cosmic
order." It is this sort of pride that Niebuhr was later to identify as man's
sin. 38 Pride colors man's ambitions with the desire for perfection and eternity
within history.
36Ibid.
,
p. 218.
37ibid.
,
p. 53.
38 Cf. Beyond Tragedy
,
pp. 27-30.
This important doctrine of original sin was given a clear statement in
this early book:
If men disavow all faith in a power not their own
which makes for righteousness, they cannot finally
save themselves from either arrogance or despair.
Both the sin of pride, through arrogance, and the despair that comes from a
too pessimistic view of human history could be alleviated (though not elimi-
nated) by the acceptance of both "naive faith" and the reality of limitations
upon man r s "critical intelligence." 40 This argument is typical of Niebuhr's
method of introducing two extremes — in this case optimism (arrogance) and
pessimism (despair) — and working toward a greater truth between the two.
His philosophy of history later became the expression of man's ability to view
the events within the relativities of history from a position beyond history. 41
But since man himself is caught in history, he cannot absolutize his perceptions
into laws. He can only have faith that his view of history does have meaning.
This saves man from despair, and at the same time takes from him the arro-
gance which comes with knowledge based upon anything naturalistic. Man's
knowledge of the meaning of history is based on a faith.
Niebuhr, in 1927, saw the choice as one "between the moral ennui of
pessimism and the sentimentality of an unqualified optimism. " 42 The
39Does Civilization Need Religion? , p. 52.
4Q
Ibid.
,
p. 123.
41See Beyond Tragedy
,
pp. 188-193.
42
Does Civilization Need Religion?, p. 194; cf. p. 209.
"sentimentality" that he suggested was the optimistic view of human nature,
which seemed too absolute a doctrine to account for the varieties of human
behavior. The impoi-tant point, however, is the fact that he set up two sharply
opposing polarities, and then merged them. In the process the issue became
clouded — was man good or evil? Was he capable of discerning meaning in
history? The result was a paradox; confusion was left by the elimination of
absolutes capable of comprehension through man's "critical intelligence." But
Niebuhr was insistent upon this destruction of clear-cut opposing forces:
Am. absolute dualism either between God and the universe
or between man and nature, or spirit and matter, or
good and evil, is neither possible or necessary. ^3
While he deprecated man's ability to reason his way to an optimistic
view of human Mature, he did not therefore contend that the goodness of man
was limited by the extent of man's "critical intelligence." Rather, he imagined
there to be "undeveloped resources" of human love and creativity that could be
tapped only by faith. 44
Two further semantic points about this book should be made. The first
is that Niebuhr saw fit on several occasions to speak of the "tragedy of history."
In each case the meaning did not involve the apocalyptic sense that the "tragedy
of history" was to later imply. 46 Yet the phrase — that was later to carry so
43
Ibid.
,
p. 20©,
44
Ibid.
,
pp. 41-42; cf. p. 22,
45
Ibid., pp. 185, 208.
4fi
See Human Destiny, pp. 47-52.
18
much meaning - was used in 1927. The second point has to do again with
Niebuhr T s fascination with the idea of the "prophet. " In defending the prophet
against the priest, he wrote this:
There is no way of guaranteeing the reality of God
if someone does not make him real in experience,
and there is no way of declaring the victory of the
ideal if someone does not defeat reality in the name
of the ideal in history.^
It is apparent that Niebuhr T s prophet is someone who stands a step above the
"relativities of history, " yet, for the sake of countering the false reality with
a true ideal, is also capable of stepping down into history. One might suggest
that Niebuhr T s prophet is a philosopher of history.
_5.
The overall contribution of Does Civilization Need Religion? to Niebuhr T s
philosophy of history is impressive. Yet the arguments, though present, had not
been consciously formulated as they may relate to history, nor was the language
as decisive as it became in later works.
The most important factor introduced was the methodological one of
paradox. This controversial device was to become the crux not only to Niebuhr r s
philosophy of history but also his theology. Another significant element is the
question of human evil, and the optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of
human nature. The evil inherent in man became one reason that man could not
fulfill himself in history. 4y Man was incapable of creating his own destiny
because his evil would continually corrupt the best efforts of his "critical
intelligence." This is what makes the theory of human sin anti
-rationalist,
for it presupposes that man is unable to fulfill his own history, that he is un-
able to create a "heaven on earth, M or a Utopia. In an article in 1928 Niebuhr
repeated this theme:
The war convinced me that religion can be effective
only if it resists the embraces of civilization. The
moral and religious ideal is in conflict with civiliza-
tion as much as with nature. There is, indeed, no
easy road to the millennium. ^9
The language is of religion, but the same reasoning was also directed toward
history.
In short, the introduction of human sin into a philosophical system
slights human reason because it imposes a limit on reason's capacity. One
thing that reason cannot do is escape the relativities of history and foresee the
"end" of history. Either history can be consigned to meaninglessness (pessi-
mism: despair) or the present reality can be excerpted from the relativity and
made absolute (optimism: arrogance). The third alternative, suggested by
Niebuhr in the form of paradox, is that man can know the end of history by faith
4^For two examples of liberal backlash against Niebuhr 1 s introduction of human
sin into his philosophy of history, see Sidney Hook, "Intelligence and Evil in
Human History: An Answer to Intellectual Defeatism, " Commentary , 3 (Mar
1947), 210-221; and Charles Frankel, The Case for Modem Man (New York,
1955), chapter 6.
"What the War Did to My Mind, " The Christian Century , 45 (September 27,
1928), 1162-1163.
20
thus curing his despair — yet continue to function within the relativities of
history — thus saving himself from arrogance. 50 The first two philosophies
of history are more rational in that they do not introduce the supernatural.
Niebuhr T s point in Does Civilization Need Religion? was that, despite the
irrationality of supernatural belief, civilization did indeed need it. He later
elaborated more explicitly the need for an effective philosophy of history based
upon the supernatural. ^
50The discussion below, in chapter V, explains the way in which Niebuhr
elaborated this paradox in the form of an immanent-transcendent God.
51The first partially complete treatment was published in Reflections on the
of an Era, in 1934. See below, chapter V.
Ill
THE 1920 T S (PART 2 )
Reinhold Niebuhr' s second book, Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed
52Cynic, was published in 1929. The work was in the form of a diary for
Niebuhr T s years in Detroit, from 1915 to 1928. Although he was at the Union
Theological Seminary in 1929, many of the thoughts of this diary remain those
of a young pastor in the process of developing a personal theology. For this
reason the work is in some ways the most revealing of Niebuhr' s books, and
it serves as an intimate introduction to the man's thought.
2-
Although Does Civilization Need Religion? was published only one year
before this diary was completed, there are some relevant passages in the Leaves
that bear on Niebuhr 's philosophy of history, and which were not brought into as
sharp a focus in the earlier book.
The first point has to do with Niebuhr T s Christology — and here is a
clear example of the intermingling of Niebuhr T s theology with his vision of his-
tory. In an entry in 1925, Niebuhr confessed that after years of questioning, he
had finally found a role for the crucifixion: it was the "symbol of ultimate reality.
It is because the cross of Christ symbolizes something in
the very heart of reality, something in universal experience
that it has its central place in history. Life is tragic and
the most perfect tvpe of moral beauty inevitably has at least
a touch of the tragic in it. uo
52Reinhold Niebuhr, Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic (Chicago, 1929;
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The two important features of this interpretation are that the Christ-image
was placed at the center of historical reality, and that the image was accepted
as symbolic (later to become "mythical"). A further element is the statement
that "life is tragic, " with the implication that the redemption from life's tragedy
depends upon the symbolic reality of the cross of Christ. These images were
all later developed integrally into Niebuhr T s philosophy of history.^
An entry in 1926 argued the same point:
The history of every nation and every people makes
the crucifixion a perennial and a universal historical
fact .... The cross is central in the Christian
religion
. . . because it symbolizes a cosmic as well
as an historic truth .... The cross of Jesus is truly
the most adequate symbol of both the strategy and the
destiny of love not only in history but in the universe.^
In this year, 1926, Niebuhr had already accepted as true the "absurdity" of the
crucifixion as a perennial historical truth. He even accepted the non-scientific
nature of his discovery:
The ultimate nature of reality cannot be grasped by
science alone; poetic imagination is as necessary
as scientific precision. u
"Reality" was not, therefore, the exclusive province of scientific reason.
See Human Destiny
, pp. 36-37, for a statement of the central meaning of
Christ in history, Cf . also Beyond Tragedy , chapter 15.
'Leaves
,
pp. 122-123.
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,
p. 145. Niebuhr at this time, and later, was not hesitant about using
the word "absurd" to describe his beliefs.
A good example of Niebuhr T s method of introducing two polarities and
then combining them to arrive at the "truth" is this entry in 1927:
Fundamentalists have at least one characteristic in
common with most scientists. Neither can under-
stand that poetic and religious imagination has a way
of arriving at truth by giving a clue to the total mean-
ing of things without being in any sense an analytic
description of detailed facts. ^
The fundamentalists, who take Biblical teachings literally rather than symboli-
cally, and the scientists, who refuse to accept either the literal or the symbolic
truth of the "religious imagination," both suffer, in Niebuhr's view, from an
inability to grasp the "total meaning of things. " The meaning (in history) is
intelligible only as fulfilled by theological (non-literal) truths. The method
used to gain this answer — dialectical reasoning — is, in part, paradoxical.
Neither of the two polarities is incorrect, but they fail to give meaning to their
subject. Meaning is attained when the search for literal truth — whether
fundamentalist or scientific — is abandoned.
This point about fundamentalism is relevant as more than an example
of one of Niebuhr's polarities. His Neo -Orthodoxy and his distrust of reason
created in his mind the feeling that he was "talking like a fundamentalist. " He
expressed this feeling in 1928 after making the following statement:
Ibid.
,
pp. 166-167.
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They /modern religious educators/ want a
completely rational faith and do not realize that
they are killing religion by a complete rationaliza-
tion .... Life is a battle between faith and reason
in which each feeds on the other, drawing
sustenance from it and destroying it
. . . .Reason,
without the balance of faith, destroys a civilization
soon enough
. . .
.^8
Niebuhr T s theology became "fundamentalist" only to the point of placing limits
upon the utility of reason. More importantly, his philosophy of history became
his attempt to combine "faith" and "reason" into a meaningful expression of
human destiny. He was unwilling to deny one or the other in his search for
meaning in history.
Niebuhr's denial that religion is "an end in itself" 59 is also typical of
the thinking he was later to apply to the relationship between religion and his-
tory. In a similar way that history cannot fulfill itself, but is dependent upon
a reality "beyond history, " religion could not be divorced from history's
relativities and made the fulfillment of life. Religion did not guarantee the
millennium — that would be unveiled only at the end of history, and therefore
also at the end of religion (as known by man)
.
One other revealing statement in this book has to do with prophets:
Philosophers are not usually prophets. They are
too reasonable and circumspect to create or pre-
serve the prophetic vision. u
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Again, it is the prophet rather than the philosopher who appealed to Niebuhr T s
interpretive sense of history. His later philosophy of history was to be much
more "prophetic" than "philosophic.
"
2.
Niebuhr T s Detroit diary does not add pivotal elements to his philosophy
of history, nor is there any systematization of his thinking. The change from
the parish environment to the academic community at Union Theological Seminary
in 1928 was a major factor in his development over the next ten years. Two other
vital influences were the Depression and the coming of the Second World V/ar.
Before following the course of his development through these years, it
will be useful to look back at what Niebuhr had learned in the 1920 T s. Perhaps
his most significant discovery — in relation to his philosophy of history — v/as
the usefulness of paradox. Although much theological writing is supposedly para-
doxical in spite of itself, in the 1920 T s this was not a common method of argument.
Both fundamentalism and "social science" held deep roots in religious thinking;^
neither relished the accusation that they were "absurd." Niebuhr elevated — or
was to elevate — absurdity into respectability in the form of paradox.
The other methodological form already evident in the 1920 T s was that of
dialectical argument. The transference of ideas is difficult to judge, but it must
be pointed out that Niebuhr T s dialectical method was little different from the
61
"Social science" often implies "religious" presuppositions in that a single
truth — whether about man or one particular aspect of man — is believed
without any significant qualification.
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dialectical theology first expounded by Karl Earth in 1918 in The Epistle to the
Romans. The purpose of Earth's dialectic was to maintain the transcendence of
God against the relativities of history. 62 Niebuhr did not immediately apply
this dialectical method to history, but in the 1920 f s he did begin to argue for a
higher truth from a base of two polarities. 63
In this connection we have also noted that, in terms of subject-matter,
Niebuhr had not yet directed his attention to the problem of history. However,
the arguments by which he presented his theology were the same that he was
later to employ in a systematic approach to history. For this reason we are
able to discover in these earlier writings many antecedents of his later philoso-
phy of history.
The Christ-image is an especially important element in Niebuhr T s
thinking. He was conscious of its relevance, in 1925, as a symbolic event
having perennial meaning. Later, this symbolism was to expand into a more
complex system of myths by which the New Testament teachings were given
an eternal meaning in history.^ The Christ-image was also to serve as the
Cf. Thomas W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History: A Critical Comparison
of Ernest Troeltsch and Karl Barth (New York, 1965)
.
From 1928 to the 1950 T s Niebuhr and Barth have conducted a somewhat random
"debate, " with the bulk of material coming from Niebuhr T s pen. D. B. Robert-
son has collected Niebuhr T s articles on Barth for convenient study in Reinhold
Niebuhr: Essays in Applied Christianity (Cleveland, 1959), pp. 141-193. For
a useful review of the controversy see June Bingham, Courage to Change: An
Introduction to the Life and Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York, 1961),
pp. 337-344.
See Niebuhr r s article, "The Truth in Myths," in The Nature of Religious
Experience: Essays in Honor of Douglas Clyde Macintosh (New York, 1937)
.
crucial point of contact between man and God — the contact through which history
was given meaning.
Two particular elements that were given some mention in the 1920' s are
the capacity of man to do evil, and the limitations of man's critical intelligence,
or, his reason. The doctrine of evil, or sin, was not yet elaborated to the stage
in which man's arrogance before God — his pride — included his futile attempts
to consummate his own history. Nor was man's fascination with the doctrine of
reason yet explicitly related to his pride. Niebuhr did realize, however, that
reason alone would not enable man to attain the ideal which, he suggested, ful-
filled the meaning of history. In an article in 1929, he placed strictures upon
the utility of man's reason, and at the same time argued the need for the irra-
tional, the absurd:
The function of religion is to preserve life's highest
irrationality, the urge toward the ideal ....
Completely rational ideals are either completely
separated from the world or reality, or completely
identified with it. In either case moral vigor is
lost. . . . Without faith, therefore, a reasonable
life must sink into unreasonable pessimism. 00
It is perhaps too easy to read into these early writings the more mature
thoughts of the later works, especially when one is dealing with so amorphous
a subject as a philosophy of history. However, the later and more systematic
thought is both more intelligible and less "absurd" when its roots are un-
covered. It would seem apparent at this stage that whatever formal philosophy
of history Niebuhr developed was not set apart from his intellectual growth as a
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whole. Nor is it especially rewarding to speak of his philosophy of history in
isolation from the early thought patterns that guided its evolution. However
unfair it may be to overemphasize shadowy references in early writings, it is
altogether too simplistic to assume that Niebuhr T s philosophy of history can be
entirely understood from The Nature and Destiny of Man or Faith and History
.
IV
THE EARLY 1930 T S
In the decade of the Depression, Reinhold Niebuhr published five books —
two in 1932, one in 1934, one in 1935, and one in 1937. He then delivered the
Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh in the spring and fall of 1939, and published them
in 1941 and 1943. Still another book was published in 1940. Of the two books
published in 1932, the first, The Contribution of Religion to Social Work,^ is
of little value in the discussion of Niebuhr T s philosophy of history. The other
book, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics,^ is of
some value, though its concentration is not yet directed systematically toward
history.
Moral Man and Immoral Society was Niebuhr T s first major publication,
and it established his reputation as an important American theologian. He had
been known through his articles in The Christian Century and The Atlantic
Monthly in the 1920' s, but the appointment to the Union Theological Seminary,
and the publication of a sharply worded book on contemporary society, in which
the theological content was minimal, thrust him into both the secular and non-
secular limelight. He has remained there ever since.
66Reinhold Niebuhr, The Contribution of Religion to Social Work (New York, 1932).
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The key argument in Moral Man and Immoral Society was that
individual men could exercise certain moral restraints on their sinful tendencies,
whereas men in groups were not burdened by an individual sense of morality,
and were therefore capable of much greater evil. This thought was by no means
new to Niebuhr's thinking. He had shown his awareness of a difference between
individual and group morality in an article in 1927,^8 and in Does Civilization
Need Religion ? he had written that "all human groups tend to be more predatory
than the individuals which compose them." The difference was that in 1932 he
expanded these undeveloped statements into a major thesis about man and society.
The book therefore marks the beginning of Niebuhr T s systematic thought — though
it was not yet directed toward history,
_2.
A major theme of Moral Man and Immoral Society , and one which bears
upon man's relationship with history, is the inability of man's reason to control
his collective behavior:
Modern educators are, like rationalists of all the
ages, too enamoured of the function of reason in
life. The world of history, particularly in man's
collective behavior, will never be conquered by
reason, unless reason uses tools, and is itself
70
driven by forces which are not rational.
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But Niebuhr did not devote his whole attention to the limitations of pure reason,
for he also added a chapter on the "religious resources" (and limitations) of
human society. Again, we see that he set up polarities — reason and religion -
and worked from them.
The weakness of reason, according to Niebuhr, was that it presumed
human nature to be amenable to the logic of one particular dogmatism, i.e.
,
reason. He traced the beginning of the assumptions of human perfectability to
the Enlightenment. From that period, he wrote, rationalists have exhibited a
two-fold error: (1) that man is essentially a rational creature who will submit
to the force of reason, (2) that the force of reason will direct man to some type
of utopia — whether it be capitalistic, socialistic, or communistic
.
Although he admitted that there were "possibilities of increasing social
justice through the development of mind and reason, " ' 1 the error of the ration-
alists was that they assumed too much concerning both human nature and the
utility of reason. Niebuhr believed that the rationalists were naive to think that
"reason" would triumph over "power."
Men will not cease to be dishonest, merely because
their dishonesties have been revealed or because
they have discovered their own deceptions. Wherever
men hold unequal power in society, they will strive to
maintain it. *
In addition to this, men will become less susceptible to reason and moralism, and
73
more prone to act on impulse, when they congregate in groups.
71Ibid.
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This gloomy analysis of the nature of man is not the sort of thinking
to
that an optimistic social scientist (or a politician) would be likely to produce.
The portion of truth from which Niebuhr expanded into a polarity his doctrine
concerning the limitation of reason is the following:
Even the most rational men are never quite rational
when their own interests are at stake. 74
The problem with reason was that it could not get outside itself. Or more pre-
cisely, the man who used reason exclusively would still have to admit that he
was acting within history, with all of the relativity and preconditioning that is
implied by an act within history. Reason could not, therefore, be the final
arbitrator for the self because even reason was dependent upon the person who
used it. When this line of argument was applied to men in groups, the efficacy
of a truely impartial reason became correspondingly more tenuous.
Although he was seeking primarily to criticize the extensive assumptions
that rationalists made concerning the use of reason in society as a whole,
Niebuhr also drew into the discussion some comment upon the individual ego.
He made a tentative step toward defining human self-consciousness — "the fruit
of reason" — as the instrument which caused man to seek the infinite. Man
became aware of his finitude, and at the same instant recognized the possibility
of the eternal. 75 This conflict within man — later elaborated and designated as
a prime reason for man's search for meaning in history — was not here developed.
74Ibid.
,
p. 44.
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76See Human Nature, pp. 182-186.
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But a vital question arises: if man must be wary of his own reason, by
what means shall he direct his life? The answer to this is not simple, and
Niebuhr did not intend to give an easy solution. Furthermore, the emphasis of
Moral Man and Immoral Society was not theological. But the pessimistic
analysis of human nature, as shown in the light of reason (with Niebuhr T s help)
implied an effort to supply some further "resources" to bolster up man's
77
vision of himself and society.
In terms of his philosophy of history, this chapter on man's "rational
resources" was the first systematic attack on man's "critical intelligence."
In this sense the dike was thereafter opened for the promulgation of a philosophy
of history based on presuppositions other than man's reason. This systematic
treatment was not contained in Moral Man and Immoral Society , but it is impor-
tant that the systematic groundwork was being laid, in 1932, for his later philoso-
phy of history.
3.
The "resources" by which Niebuhr presumed to put the pessimism (or
optimism) of a purely rational vision of history into equilibrium, were those of
religion. Religion provided "a sense of the absolute. "
Viewed from the relative perspectives of the historic
scene, there is no human action which cannot be justi-
fied in terms of some historic purpose or approved in
comparison with some less virtuous action. The
absolute reference of religion eliminates these partial
perspectives and premature justifications.
77See below section 3 of this chapter.
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An absolute, in the form of religion, was Niebuhr's answer to the relativities
of history.
Niebuhr understood the despair of men who recognized the existence of
an ideal, yet who saw no way to realize that ideal in history. 79 On the other
hand, he decided that those who did profess to see progress in history, and
who located the ideal within the historical process, must have some stake in
the particular "progress" that was made, and the "ideal" that was identified. 80
More simply, the privileged classes do not "suffer as much as the disinherited
from the brutalities of contemporary society, and therefore do not take as
catastrophic a view of contemporary history. " 81 hi the eyes of the disinherited —
MP
and the "truly religious man" — it was not man who redeemed history but God.
But this was not, according to Niebuhr, a call for complete religious
moralism in judging history. He felt it to be an "obvious fact" that "no nation
in history has ever been known to be purely unselfish in its actions. " 82 Here
was a warning that religious idealism, no less than rational idealism, needed to
be tempered at every step by a "realistic" appraisal of man's position within the
relativities of history. The realization that man acted within history, and yet was
*
-
in possession of an ideal whose source was above history, did not remove from
man the responsibility of making decisions commensurate with the facts — however
relative — that were presented. To do otherwise would be either to lapse into sen-
timentality or to abdicate from human history and escape to an "ivory tower."
79Ibid.
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p. 61.
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In spite of this warning — this limitation placed on the religious
"resource" — the value of religion to human history was not in doubt.
Without the ultrarational hopes and passions of religion
no society will ever have the courage to conquer despair
and attempt the impossible; for the vision of a just
society is an impossible one, which can be approximated
only by those who do not regard it as impossible. The
truest visions of religion are illusions, which may be
partially realized by being resolutely believed. For
what religion believes to be true is not wholly true but
ought to be true; and may become true if its truth is
not doubted. 83
The passage is representative of an important element in Niebuhr T s
philosophy of history. This is the belief that human wisdom could only approxi-
mate the ideal society, and that the Utopian religious visions, when applied to
history, were illusions. Yet at the same time these illusions were "true";
»
they were an "impossible ideal" that ought to be possible but was not. This
was a paradox: man should live by an impossible ideal.
By arguing in this way, Niebuhr had committed his vision of history to
certain presuppositions. The first was that a fulfillment to history was impos-
sible by means of human reason and wisdom. The second was that the super-
natural ideal, assumed by a religious interpretation, was also incapable of
realization within history. It was an impossible vision, and the hope that it
would be achieved within history was an illusion. The first presupposition was
entirely earth-bound: its limits (i.e., those of man 1 s reason) were explicit,
and it had no further assistance to render man's historical dilemma. The second
alternative also failed to fulfill human history. But it was a supernatural
3Ibid.
,
p. 81.
presupposition: would this be of any value for man within history?
"Realistically" it would not — it was an impossible ideal, capable only of
being approximated. In 1932, Niebuhr did not pursue this problem. Later,
the value of the "true illusion" was found: it gave meaning to history. 84 In
Moral Man and Immoral Society Niebuhr did not fully consider the problem of
history, and his systematic analysis of rational and religious presuppositions
did not logically instill history with anything but meaninglessness.
_4.
The rest of Moral Man and Immoral Society did not add significantly to
Niebuhr T s philosophy of history. There were times when he spoke of the
"perennial tragedy of human history," the "spiritual and brutal elements in
human life, " and "the end of history, " but these references were more rhetori-
cal than systematic. His concentration remained upon rnan f s relations with him-
self in society, upon his ethics, and his politics. Man T s relationship with his
own history and with God were not included in the discussion.
Niebuhr did, in these early years of the Depression, display a strong
interest in Marxism. In 1931 he noted, with appreciation, that the communist
o c
vision of history v/as "catastrophic and apocalyptic rather than evolutionary." 00
His own philosophy of history was far from evolutionary, though he had not yet
systematically explained its apocalyptic tone. In regard to the Marxian vision
See the first chapter of Beyond Tragedy , which is entitled "As Deceivers, Yet
True."
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of history, he went on to warn that its absoluteness placed it in "the category
of religious overbeliefs rather than that of scientific truths. " 86 His own
philosophy of history also became divorced from "scientific truths, " but he
did not create the "overbelief" of absolutizing his dogma within history.
In 1932, Niebuhr was not unaware of the relationship between his view
of man, society, and history. He could refer to the failure of man to achieve
his "highest ideals" in "social and collective terms" as a perennial tragedy
of history. And he even made the direct reference to "beyond history" in re-
lation to man's life in history:
It is inevitable that religious imagination should set
goals beyond history.
But this suggestion was not elaborated, either in his articles or in Moral Man
and Immoral Society.
He did no more than use history to support his arguments concerning
man and society. For example, the following passage is indicative of his discus
sion of formal "philosophy of history" in the early 1930 T s.
Any philosophy of history which proceeds under the
assumption that a religious change of heart or type
of social education will make one economic group
perfectly ethical toward another economic group
without some pressure from the underprivileged
group, is discredited by the facts of history. 88
Philosophy of history was subservient to the "facts of history." Niebuhr was to
retain a portion of this emphasis, but not in the simple form expressed here.
86Moral Man and Immoral Society , p. 167.
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His philosophy of history was to break away from history enough to assume a
certain independence from the relativity of history's facts.
Although Moral Man and Immoral Society contributed nothing to Niebuhr'
s
systematic philosophy of history aside from the bounds placed upon reason, and
the presupposition that the fulfillment of history was TTbeyond history, M the book
did offer several suggestive arguments that were later to become important.
Niebuhr recognized the problem of absolutism early in the 1930 T s — if
not before. He judged that much of the economic misery in the world was the
result of situations which lent themselves to destructive, absolutist tendencies
in men. However, he did not jump in the other direction.
Absolutism, in both religious and political idealism,
is a splendid incentive to heroic action, but a
dangerous guide in immediate and concrete situations.
In religion it permits absurdities and in politics cruel-
ties, which fail to achieve justifying consequences
because the inertia of human nature remains a nemesis
89
to the absolute ideal.
Niebuhr was unwilling to grant to reason the assurance of absolute relevance;
neither would he absolutize a religious idealism. Instead, he was to depend upon
the less certain support of paradox. If this produced absurdities — and it did —
they were less dangerous, Niebuhr felt, than those rendered by arguments which
explicitly pronounced the Truth in the form of an Absolute.
I have suggested above that Niebuhr 1 s philosophy of history at this time
was little more than a device for marshalling facts to support a presupposition.
This tendency to submit his philosophy of history to the test of history
T
s "facts"
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remained with Niebuhr. The unanswerable question concerns the interpretation
given to the facts — whether they support one philosophy of history or another.
Nevertheless, the desire to match his philosophy in some way with history 1 s
relativities remained important for Niebuhr. This desire is illustrated through-
out Moral Man and Immoral Society. For example, after a perceptive analysis
of the relations between whites and Negroes in America — in which he wrote
that Negroes would never achieve complete emancipation "merely by trusting
in the moral sense of the white race" — he argued that
the white race in America will not admit the Negro
to equal rights if it is not forced to do so. Upon that
point one may speak with a dogmatism which all his-
tory justifies. 90
Niebuhr not only felt that history could somehow "justify, " but that this justifi-
cation allowed one to be dogmatic. He was never so bold in expounding his supra-
historical justifications. It may well be that the assertive words were more
rhetorical than significant. The historian of ideas does run the risk of mistaking
the thunder and lightning for the rain.
Ibid., pp. 252-253.
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V
THE MIDDLE 1930'S (PART 1)
With Reflections on the End of an Era
,
^ published in 1934, we come
to the first major work in Reinhold Niebuhr's philosophy of history. The book
is not wholly, nor even primarily, devoted to philosophy of history, but of its
twenty chapters several are genuine landmarks in the systematic exposition of
his philosophy of history. The hope for this book was the following:
Perhaps they /the "reflections'^/ will help a little
to shake the easy faith by which the actual and tragic
facts of contemporary history are, in the opinion of
the present writer, obscured.^
The shaking of the "easy faithn necessitated — in addition to other factors —
a new vision of history for men in the middle 1930' s. A new meaning for his-
tory needed to be made explicit. ^3
JL.
Perhaps the most important chapter is that entitled "Mythology and
History. " In this chapter, Niebuhr spoke of the kind of philosophy of history
which he deemed adequate, and he discussed the importance of meaning in history.
A philosophy of history must relate the empiricism of the scientist to the imagina-
tion of the artist, in addition to adding "religious depth to philosophical generaliza-
tions. "
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An adequate philosophy of history must ... be a
mythology rather than a philosophy .... A vision
of the whole is possible only if it is assumed that
human history has meaning; and modern empiricism
is afraid of that assumption. Meaning can be attrib-
uted to history only by a mythology. 9^
The problem with "modern empiricist" philosophies of history was that they
were not aware of the mythology underlying their own interpretations, and were
therefore unable to plumb the depths of history and its tragedy. 9 ^ To be genuine-
ly useful, a mythology of history "must be able to do justice to the suggestions
of meaning in momentary chaos. " And yet, even a philosophy of history based
upon mythology could not be
absolutely true in the sense that it is the only possible
interpretation of all the facts. But neither can it be
assumed that a science of history which disavows
mythology is more accurate in its description of the
detailed facts. 9 ^
Niebuhr here bluntly announced his intention of finding meaning in history
through recourse to mythology — which to Niebuhr meant the supernatural. 97
Although he spoke of a "mythology of history, " it is still appropriate to refer to
his analysis as a philosophy of history. The point at issue is the presuppositions
that are held. All philosophies of history hold certain "givens" as the basis of
i
their meaning. It is obvious that, in 1934, Niebuhr was intent upon applying
supernatural insights to derive meaning from history.
94Reflections on the End of an Era , pp. 122-123.
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standing of history. (The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr , op. cit., p. 73.)
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With tftfls presupposition of Niebuhr's philosophy of history expressed
more systematically than it had been previously, we can now explore the
manner in whidh he developed — with a vigor appropriate to his writing in
1934 — its ramifications.
The justification for holding any philosophy of history at all was succinct-
ly expressed in this way;
Interpretations of history actually tend to verify
tfcemselves, when rigorously held, because they
cffirect the course of history toward an imagined
inevitable goal. 98
It was thus not ;a hopeless pursuit to believe in a particular philosophy of history.
This argument fts reminiscent of the "relevance of the impossible" (which itself
was not systematized until the following year) . There had been suggestions
earlier in Niefe^hr's writings that he saw justification for an "obviously" absurd
belief. A mythological philosophy of history was by definition absurd to a rational
man — yet it wcrald, "when rigorously held, " "direct the course of history toward
an imagined inevitable goal." The rational man is incapable of repudiating such
an "imagined inevitable goal, " for his philosophy cannot analyze a goal when it is
based upon suparnaturalism. Rather, the "goal" can only be rejected, or excluded
from discussion.
Niebuhr devoted over ten pages in this chapter to a comparison of
Augustinian, Jewish, and Marxist philosophies of history." The most significant
98
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similarity, according to Niebuhr, was the Marxist and Christian sense of an
apocalypse. In this respect, Marxian thought was closer to Jewish apocalypti-
cism that to Hellenistic interpretations of history. In the latter, reason was the
key to man's life, and was the instrument by which history was transcended.
Contrary to this, "in Jewish religion there is always the hope that history it-
self will be redeemed and that spirit will reduce its confusions to order and
harmony." The key to transcendence was spirit rather than reason.
However, "Christian orthodoxy, " according to Niebuhr — and this is a
point that he was to make repeatedly in his later writings, had followed the Greek
emphasis upon the transcendence of reason rather than the Jewish-prophetic
choice of the spirit.
If one studied the thought of Jesus and the early church it would be evi-
dent that they were "truer to the Jewish interpretation of the relation of the
spirit to nature, " and "lived by the hope that history itself was to be redeemed. "102
The last part of this passage explains what is meant by the apocalypse: rather
than the redemption of man through reason, the end of history would redeem his-
tory itself. This difficult concept is one that can be understood only by recourse
to the spirit, rather than a reliance upon reason. It is possible for man to use
reason to plan his own redemption. But when reason is applied to the whole of
history, that device becomes incapable of encompassing the heights and depths of
history T s tragedy, and therefore reason cannot redeem history — it cannot give
1QQ
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meaning to history. The spirit, and the force of faith (even if it be "absurd"),
does have the necessary capacity.
The "genuine" Christian interpretation anticipated the end of history as
an apocalypse, which was in the tradition of the prophets. The "liberal Christian"
view of history (e.g.
, as taught by John Dewey) did not interpret an "end" but
rather a steadily increasing growth of humanity — by means of reason — toward
the millennium. The apocalypse was not necessary, for man, through reason,
would redeem himself. In contradistinction to this, Marxism foresaw that the
"reason" employed was merely directed toward maintaining the prerogatives of
one class, and that class alone was heading toward its own utopia. For the rest
of mankind to follow, the present civilization must be destroyed — there must
come, in other words, an apocalypse. Up to this point, the Marxist philosophy
of history closely paralleled the prophetic vision, but the break came when, after
the apocalypse, the Marxist vision predicted that the proletarian class would
assume the reins of leadership in the drive toward the millennium. The redemp-
tion of history would again be in the hands of a human rather than a spiritual force.
Niebuhr, in his later writings, spelled out this "error" in the Marxist philosophy
103
of history more explicitly.
It should not be assumed that Niebuhr intended to resolve the conflict
between spirit and nature (or faith and reason) by pronouncing a spiritual inter-
pretation of history to be more accurate. A central aim of Niebuhr 1 s thought was
to assure that man would not feel justified in absolutizing any one vision of himself
103See Human Destiny
, pp. 86-87, and Faith and History , pp. 160-161.
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and his history. Whatever absolute did exist, would need to wait until the end
of history in order to be fully accepted by man. Tension would remain as a safe-
guard against man's pride within history:
The tension between spirit and nature must remain
to the end of history lest the impulses of nature
clothe themselves with the moral prestige of the
spiritual and secure a moral immunity behind which
they express themselves without moral restraint.
The chapter entitled "The Conflict Between Christianity and Communism"
offers some insight into the comparison of Marxist and prophetic philosophies of
history. Niebuhr made an effort to explain the differences between the two world
outlooks. One important factor was that communism pretended to arise from a
scientific base. In like manner with the "irreligious naturalism of bourgeois
culture," communism tried to invest history with purpose and meaning through a
scientific analysis of the "facts."
In both cases it is denied that this purpose has a
conscious author or that there is any revelation of
his intent in anything but the facts of history them-
selves, 105
Thus, the communist and bourgeois philosophies were both naturalistic in that
they denied any supernatural influence.
Niebuhr believed that the "actual contemporary facts of history, " justified
"the more pessimistic proletarian philosophy of history much more than the purely
1Q4Reflections on the End of an Era
,
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optimistic bourgeois view. rr 106 111 spite of this, communism was too certain —
too absolute — in its faith in the "scientific analysis" of history T s "facts." It
failed to understand that its view of history was based upon a faith, and in this
sense it was religious.
Nevertheless its confident faith, that good will grow out
of disaster, belongs definitely to the category of mythology
rather than science. Both the bourgeois idea of progress
and the Marxian idea of salvation through catastrophe
express a faith in the character of life and history which
is religious rather than scientific. 107
Thus, one part of the problem with the Marxist philosophy was that it did
not recognize the non-scientific basis, or presupposition, of its methodology.
Its methodology was "scientific" in that it excluded the supernatural, but this
in itself was a form of religion. It was Niebuhr's belief that any world-view that
found "the mechanisms of the cosmos either neutrally amenable, or profoundly
sympathetic to human ideals," was mythological and religious. 108 This was so
because if one understood the universe, one had — in a sense — conquered it.
Since man had "conquered" the universe he must therefore have made it relevant
to himself. There being no scientific method to show man's relevance to his his-
tory - i.e. , to demonstrate the meaning of man within history, any system of
thought that claimed to do this must be religious. It was not necessary to pre-
suppose a "conscious author" behind history's meaning — as neither bourgeois
naturalism nor communism did — because the devices of mechanism and rational-
ism explained enough to satisfy the naturalist. But for one who probed underneath
the naturalistic cover, it was evident that the system was indeed a religion, and
106 107 108
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therefore liable to criticism for not accepting or recognizing that fact.
In spite of this failure to accept themselves as forms of religion, how
adequate — religiously — were bourgeois naturalism and proletarian communism?
According to Niebuhr, these two interpretations had elements of "irreligion" in
them which weakened their ability to give meaning to history.
For a full-orbed religion not only interprets all
events in history in terms of an ultimate meaning,
but it also believes that this meaning and purpose
transcend any immediate event or fact in historical
reality. 109
The mistake of those philosophies which relied only on the Mfacts M was that they
were helpless to escape the relativity of those facts — they could not really
transcend history and could not therefore give true meaning to life.
It /the meaning of lifeJ cannot have anything to do
with scientific adequacy because science cannot con-
cern itself with the ultimate character and meaning
of reality. HO
For Niebuhr, the "ultimate" meaning of reality was to be found through super-
natural guidance.
The reason that "ultimate" reality was the province of the supernatural
was that man was unable to escape the relativities of history sufficiently to decide
upon an "ultimate."
The canons of logic and rationality are transcended
when reason attempts to comprehend the final
irrationality of things. Ultimate world-views there-
fore seem more or less rational to given ages and
eras because they satisfy the temper of the day by
doing justice to those fa£ts which the age regards as
particularly important.
109
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The "irreligion" that was imbedded in the scientific attempts to pronounce
meaning in history was this effort to make ultimate the vision of one particular
historical era. The other side of this double-edged sword — i.e.
, scientific
attempts to find meaning in history - was the failure of reason to transcend what
is reasonable. The idea of finding meaning in history by escaping from it and
looking down from above directly contradicts the canons of reason. If it is de-
cided that meaning in history cannot be discovered by viewing the facts within
history, then the meaning must be found in the supernatural, or in the irration-
112
al. Bourgeois naturalism and proletarian communism were unprepared —
with their reliance on "science" — to cope with the irrational.
If we continue with this logic — as Niebuhr did — we must accept the
"ultimate reality" of the absurd. It is significant that in Reflections on the End
of an Era Niebuhr, for the first time, made ample use of scriptural references
in order to defend his argument. Almost in spite of himself, he was forced to
become a theologian with unshielded theological suppositions.
Though it is never easy to relate the God of holiness
and perfection, conceived by the religious imagination,
with the actual facts of nature and history, an adequate
mythology never fails to commit the rational absurdity
of conceiving God as at once the pinnacle and the basis
of reality, the goal toward which life is striving and the
force by which it strives. u
N. P. Jacobson, in an article based upon Human Destiny , concluded that
"Niebuhr f s philosophy of history is erected upon his concept of super-history
,
"
and that meaning is derived from that super -historical foundation. ("Niebuhr T_s
Philosophy of History," The Harvard Theological Review , 37 /October, 1944/,
241.)
'Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 200.
The "rational absurdity M had now become an integral part of Niebuhr f s
philosophy of history. God was the agent who assured reality and was also
reality itself. No further questioning was possible: God was an Absolute,
for he was both reality and the basis for reality.
In addition to this fact about God, it was also evident that God was
"beyond history. M He was an absolute that was not subject to historical rela-
tivities or to scientific analysis. But a further problem arises: how can such
a God have any relevance to human history? What are the "points of contact"
between God and man? This is the problem that ultimately separates the
"believers" from the "non-believers," the naturalists from the supernatural -
ists. On.e may argue that Niebuhr T s analysis was adequate without introducing
1 1 a
the "rational absvirdity" of a God who actually made contact with history.
What would be wrong with a transcendent being who did not become involved in
history, and who allowed the world to operate much as a mechanism? With
this belief one is at least not obligated to show evidence for one T s faith.
Niebuhr T s answer to this was that the active connection between man
and God was vital to history:
It /Christian theism/ is forced to insist upon this
connection lest, having solved the problem of life by
finding its centre of meaning, it lose the solution by
placing the centre so high above the realities of
nature and history that there are lost again in chaos
and mechanism.
114Sidney Hook made this point — without answering it — in a review of
Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, eds. , Reinhold Niebuhr: His
Religious, Social, and Political Thought
^
(New York, 1956). (New York
Times Book Review /January 29, 1956/, p. 7.)
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A merely transcendent God would be inadequate for a philosophy of history
because it would release man from any moral obligations within history. God
must also be immanent:
Christian theism has solved this problem by its
conception of a transcendent-immanent God, a
conception which can never be fully rationalized
but which does justice both to the moral necessities
of human life and to the actual facts of human ex-
perience .... H6
Niebuhr was never able to separate his philosophy from ethical consid-
erations within human history. He is better known as a teacher of Applied
Christianity and Christian ethics than as a theologian or a philosopher. This
major aspect of his thought was evidently one force that impelled him to preach
r
a transcendent-immanent God, rather than the somewhat less absurd transcend-
117
ent God. He recognized the loss in rational terms of this insistence. L± 1
This was also the point at which Niebuhr broke sharply with the theology
of Karl Barth and the so-called Barthian School. The Barthians wanted to
separate completely the transcendent from the immanent God. The argument
which they used was more logical and consistent than any which Niebuhr could
muster. There was no rational way for the immanent God to escape the rela-
tivities of history, with the implication that the corruption of this immanent
God would also stain the transcendent God. To avoid this, the Barthian School
postulated a transcendent God who was completely beyond the ebb and flow of
16Ibid.
, pp. 200-201.
117Ibid.
,
p. 201.
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history. This is the argument that spurred the renewal of Protestant theology
in Europe after Barth's Epistle to the Romans in 1918, 118
Niebuhr T s criticism of these theologies was that they
cannot finally avail because in them religious pessimism
becomes too consistent and renounces the significance
and virtue of human history from the perspective of the
very ideal through which life has been saved from chaos
and meaninglessness.
Niebuhr could not understand the reason for endowing history with meaning
through a transcendent God, but then reducing history to chaos by renouncing
the immanence of God. The paradox in Niebuhr T s argument, is obvious: he
developed the concept of a transcendent God by pleading the danger of a
philosophy of history subservient to the relativities of history. He then
transformed his transcendent God into a transcendent-immanent God so that
man would have some basis for ethical action within the relativities of history. 120
Earlier in this section it was pointed out that one part of the error of
Marxist philosophy of history was that the religious — non-scientific —
presupposition of that philosophy was not recognized by its proponents. The
118
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Paul Tillich j;han by Barth. (The Protestant Search for Political Realism,
1919- 1941 /Berkeley, 1960/, pp. 272-273.) Tillich 1 s book, The Interpreta -
tion of History
,
was first published in English in 1936. For an appreciative
discussion by Niebuhr of Tillich' s book, see the last four pages of his article,
"The Contribution of Paul Tillich," Religion in Life , 6 (Autumn, 1937), 574-
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other half of the error is that the end of history — the period after the apoca-
lypse — is placed within history rather than beyond it. In this way, man
remains subject to the relativities of history, and history has therefore not
reached its end in a genuine apocalypse. The meaning given to history by the
Marxian philosophy of history is therefore inaccurate because the end of his-
tory has not been understood. It is logical — according to Niebuhr — that
meaning cannot be interpreted unless the end of human history is accepted,
for otherwise there would be no assurance that the proposed meaning was not
a reflection of one particular historical era.
Niebuhr summarized the philosophies of history of naturalism, com-
munism,- and Christianity in this way:
Judged by the criteria of optimism and pessimism
the difference between bourgeois naturalism, com-
munism and classical Christianity is that the first
is purely optimistic because it finds ethical values
completely immanent in the processes of nature and
history. Communism is partially pessimistic because
it finds the historical process of the moment running
to its socio-moral ideal. But it is ultimately optimis-
tic because it believes an organization of society
possible in which the chaos of egoistic impulse will
121be fully overcome.
The optimism associated with prophetic Christianity — in the form of a mean-
ing in history — is different from other optimisms due to a more profound
Reflections on the End of an Era , p 0 203. Donald B. Meyer reviewed
Niebuhr 1 s analysis in this way: "All modern philosophies of history —
whether evolutionary with the liberals, or catastrophic with Marxists —
were mistaken in their belief that the possibilities of chaos and evil
could be progressively eliminated. " (Protestant Search for Political
Realism
,
op. crL, p. 303.)
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accompanying pessimism. This pessimism refers to the fact that history is
unable to fulfill itself - man cannot fulfill himself, or alone attribute meaning
to his life.
Niebuhr concluded this important chapter by warning against the per-
fectionism associated with "liberal Christianity." There is a suggestion of his
developing emphasis upon man T s inevitable sinfulness and the fact that the
highest good accomplished by man is also replete with the potentiality for the
highest evil due to the "egoistic impulse" of sinful man. 122 It is this fact
that helps to make a transcendent God necessary, contrary to the hopes of
liberal Christianity which denies man's inevitable sinfulness.
4.
A third significant chapter in Reflections on the End of an Era —
sequentially the last in the book — is that entitled "The Assurance of Grace."
When Niebuhr decided that an immanent God was necessary for human history,
the problem of "points of contact" between this God and man became important,
How was man "assured" that this God was immanent? How was his grace
manifest within history?
122
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N. P. Jacobson, a religious naturalist, attempted to give an account of the
"empirical data" that Niebuhr supposedly used to "demonstrate the pull of
the transcendent upon man. " ("Niebuhr T s Philosophy of History, " oj). cit. ,
241-245.) Jacobson misses the point when he tries to analyze Niebuhr'
s
evidence, for he applies a rational method of criticism to prophetic pre-
suppositions.
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Niebuhr recognized the "tension" that existed when man both lived in
nature and was aware of the possibility of the reality of the spirit. It was to
be hoped that this spirit, this "religion of grace," would "console the human
spirit to its inevitable defeat in the world of nature and history. " 124 In addi-
tion to serving as a spiritual balm for man's tensions, this "pure religion"
would also encourage man to maintain a degree of morality within the rela-
tivities of history. 125 (This latter purpose is the argument for an immanent
God which was pointed out in the previous section.)
Niebuhr T s philosophy of history now became more theological, as he
attempted to demonstrate the validity of the immanent God. 126 His argument
also became more obscure — at least from the vantage point of analysis. He
interpreted human history as evidence of both grace and judgment. This pre-
sumably correlates with the two-fold nature of God, as both immanent and
transcendent. Only a transcendent God could act as a final judge, and, because
of man's sin, "every life deserves destruction." 127 When Niebuhr wrote that
124Reflections on the End of an Era
, p. 279.
125Ibid.
,
p. 280.
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Hans Hofmann felt assured, in following Niebuhr T s increasingly theological
language, to speak of his "theological" interpretations of history. The
Christ-event, upon which we will soon elaborate, was the key, for
"reflection upon the Christ -event
. 8 . (is/ the basis of the understanding
of history." (The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr , op. cit. , p. 119.)
Hofmann went on to suggest that, for Niebuhr, theology and the interpreta-
tion of history were closely inter-related, since the Christ-event was
central to both. Niebuhr could not speak either of theology or of history
without reference to the other, yet he did, according to Hofmann, keep them
separate.* (The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr , Ibid. , p. 204.)
127Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 286.
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"the facts of history lend themselves both to cynical and to religious inter-
pretations, " 128 he must have meant that a wholly transcendent interpretation
of God is liable to contribute to cynicism in man's attitude toward his history.
A transcendent-immanent interpretation, by contrast, assured grace as well
as judgment.
The problem remained of how to demonstrate this grace. Niebuhr T s
answer — which he elaborated in this chapter — was this:
The religious imagination sees truly when it regards
the slow processes of history and the impartialities of
nature as revelations of divine mercy. 1^9
Grace — the proof of the immanent God — was evident to those possessed with
the "religious imagination."
Niebuhr understood that faith alone was not enough. "Symbols" —
manifestations — were needed.
Religious faith needs specific symbols; and the Jesus
of history is a perfect symbol of the absolute in his-
tory because the perfect love to which pure spirit
aspires is vividly realized in the drama of his life
and cross. Thus a man becomes the symbol of God and
the religious sense that the absolute invades the rela-
tive and the historical is adequately expressed.
Throughout Niebuhr T s writing, the Jesus of history was to be the most adequate
symbol for the immanency of God. 131 Niebuhr f s Christology is an important,
128Ibid.
,
p. 286
129
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,
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131In contrast, D. R. Davies interpreted Niebuhr T s concept of the Last Judgment
as dominant in his philosophy of history. Davies is correct insofar as philoso
phy of history is confined to a study of the meaning of history. (Reinhold
Niebuhr: Prophet from America /New York, 1945/, pp. 53-54, and 65.)
and sometimes overlooked, element in his theology. 132 The drama of Jesus
life provided the perfect symbol: the absolute within the relative, and the
lesson of love by which grace was available to man. Niebuhr later expressed
more fully the meaning of this "sacrificial love" (agape) in contrast to "mutual
love,
" which is not without a degree of human egoism. 133 Grace is tendered
by means of agape
,
and the cross represents, through Christ, the proof of this
love in history. Thus, the important point of contact between God and man is
made, and God is shown to be immanent.
Although Niebuhr accepted Jesus as the "perfect symbol" of the imma-
nency of God, he was not blind to the fears of "liberal Christians," who felt
the symbol of Jesus to be imperfect since it was historical. It involved "a man
living in Galilee and speaking the language of a particular time and place." 134
If this criticism were granted, Niebuhr felt, the task of "relating the
absolute to history" would be unduly complicated. A spiritual balm (grace)
would not be available to the human spirit. A "balm" was needed which demon-
strated not only that faith and history were in conflict, but also that there was
"some ultimate resolution and reconciliation in the conflict. " 13 ^ The argument
over Jesus* existence in a particular historical period versus his claim to
transcendence over history weakened the claim for the immanency of God.
132See Paul Lehmann, "The Christology of Reinhold Niebuhr," in Charles W.
Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, eds., Reinhold Niebuhr, op. cit.
133See Human Destiny
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The long controversy about the two natures of
Christ in the history of Christian theology repre-
sents the futile effort of reason to comprehend or
to define the mythological absurdities and profundi-
ties of the original myth.
"Reason," says Niebuhr, cannot comprehend the truth of Jesus' transcendent
character. The symbol is a "mythological absurdity," yet it is profound. The
next question to be asked is why this particular event — the Christ-event — is
accepted as the significant "mythological absurdity."
The dialectical theology of the Barthian School recognized the difficulty
of this question, and therefore lifted the Christ-event itself out of history and
made it not a symbol of God's immanence, with all of the "mythological
absurdity" thereby implied, but the single intervention by God into history.
The incarnation did not demonstrate God's immanence but rather his single
venture into history to expose the Truth to the witness of man. God remained
a completely transcendent being.
Niebuhr 's disagreement with this thinking was definite. He felt that
such an interpretation could find
no meaning in history or nature except as the one
event in history (the incarnation) illumines the
scene. It is significant too that this one event in
history really ceases to be an event in history and
that the symbol of the absolute never really becomes
incarnate.
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Niebuhr would not accept an interpretation of the "perfect symbol" which
did not justify the immanence of God.
Niebuhr was also unhappy with the interpretation of the Christ-event
given by liberal Christianity. In contrast to the "consistent dualism and
pessimism" of dialectical theology, liberal Christianity seemed to offer "a
It believes that the Jesus of history was a symbol of
the absolute because he personifies Tthe highest human
values. T The goodness of human nature and finally the
ethical character of history itself are thus the revela-
tions of the absolute. If this seems more plausible and
rational to our day than the position of Christian
orthodoxy it is only because our culture has been an
optimistic one and it has not realized what frustrations
and defeats the spirit meets in the impulse of history
and nature. 140
There is, in this passage, an almost sarcastic epitomisation of the liberal
Christian attempt to identify relative human concepts of goodness with the
absolute ethics of Jesus. It is logical that one should identify one's own image
of human nature and ethical codes with an absolute. In an optimistic culture,
the force of logic does not know the illogical depths and insoluble frustrations
to which the human spirit is exposed. The attempt to transfer the relative
ethics (and optimism) of one historical era to the absolute of the Christ-event
is to destroy the meaning of that event, and to delude those who accept its
revelatory nature.
more plausible rationalism. n 139
140
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Niebuhr's complaint against dialectical theology was that it separated
so completely "the absolute and the relative, the divine and the human, the
spiritual and the natural, " that
the ultimate faith of religion in the meaningfulness
of life rests upon one event in history which is not
truly historical. Religion is thus reduced to magic. 141
The problem with liberal Christianity was that the "tension between spirit and
nature" was not recognized. The result of this failure was that "all history and
nature (including human nature)" v/as "invested prematurely with the aura of the
absolute and the perfect. "
In both cases rationalism has destroyed the original
mythological profundity of the Christian religion
which sought to express the idea that the conflict
between spirit and nature is a real conflict, that no
complete victory of spirit in history is possible, but
that defeat is turned into victory when the unachieved
perfection is discovered to be a forgiving love which
justifies (understands) man's imperfection. 1^2
The last point, about "man's imperfection," is a key to Niebuhr's
"pessimism" in regard to his philosophy of history. Rationalism as it is used
by both dialectical theologians and liberal theologians could not fully take
account of man's sin. The tension by which man both created and destroyed
was snapped.
When put in rational terms this experience /of Grace/
means that the man who is involved in the relativities of
the natural and historical process finds himself never-
theless in contact with the final and the absolute life
which is above the process. Thus the tension between
the absolute and the relative is overcome. 14 **
141
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It is possible to put in rational terms the relationship between the relative and
the absolute, and thus release the tension.
But the rationalization of the mythos robs it of some
of its significance. In purely rational terms the sin
of man becomes merely the imperfection and rela-
tivity inherent in the process of history and the sense
of personal responsibility for evil actions is lost. *44
The problem with the dialectical and liberal theologies was that they rationalized
away the tension between man's existence within the relativities of history and
his awareness of the absolute which is beyond history. For this reason the con-
cept of sin was blunted, and imperfect man felt himself justified.
The inclination to rationalize the mythological absurdity must be re-
sisted, says Niebuhr. Otherwise the effort to postulate a transcendent God is
in vain, and man is left with no moral rudder by which to guide his life through
the relativities of history.
The experience of grace, in short, can only be expressed
in mythological terms if it is not to become a peril to the
ethical life. For only in the concepts of religious myth
can an imperfect world mirror the purposes of a divine
Creator and can the mercy of God make the fact of sin
and imperfection bearable without destroying moral
responsibility for the evil of imperfection or obscuring
its realities in actual history. 145
A central fact that the modern era did not realize was that evil could not be
eliminated.
The "points of contact*' between man and an immanent God were not,
therefore, an accumulation of historical events. At least Niebuhr did not —
in 1934 — enumerate such a list, which would have been comparable to a list
144Ibid.
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of "miracles," such as those expounded by various religions, including Roman
Catholicism. Niebuhr made explicit only the one historical event of Christ.
The other signs of God T s immanency were to be taken on faith even more
completely than the semi
-historical Christ-event. The important factor here
was the nature of the self. The ego must recognize "that the blind forces of
nature which frustrate the spirit are in the self as well as outside it." 147 The
suggestion from "classical Christianity" that "repentance is the beginning of
redemption," and even that "it is sj'nonymous with redemption" is a profound
. . 148
insight. This is so because
the evils and frustrations of life and history would be,
in fact, unbearable if contrition did not reduce the pre-
sumptions and pretensions of the self and reveal the
fact that some of the confusions from which the spirit
suffers have their direct source in the chaos of the
self and that others may be regarded as punishment
for the sins of the self even if they have not been
obviously caused by them. 149
The burden of man's sin lies heavily in Niebuhr T s philosophy of history.
In this theological concept, the bond between man and the God immanent in his-
tory was sealed. Man feels the frustration of his life in history because he is
aware of the possibility of redemption from it. In order to initiate the redemp-
tive process, man must show repentance. The redemptive process is the link
between the immanent God and man, and it is also connected with the transcend-
ent God, since when man is redeemed he is beyond the relativities of history
and in the company of a God who is also beyond those relativities, i.e. , a
147Ibid., p. 295.
148Ibid. 149Ibid.
transcendent God. Thus, there is a close connection between the immanent
and transcendent God, and we are justified in speaking of an immanent-
transcendent God (paradoxical as that may seem)
.
When man shows repentance, he demonstrates two things. The first
is that man is admitting that he has sinned, and shows the necessary contrition.
The second evident fact is that man has made real, through faith, the imma-
nency of God. Man has recognized the "mythological absurdity" as a reality
by himself participating in irrationality, i.e.
,
by showing repentance for sins
of which he is not aware, and demonstrating contrition toward a force that is
rationally absurd.
It is by participating in a rational absurdity that man is made aware of
the immanency of God. Grace — the contact between God and man — must be
accepted through faith. Whether or not this proof satisfies those who are not
willing to extend their faith to that point, it is true that it clarifies the process
by which Niebuhr finds meaning in history. The most convincing justification
which Niebuhr offers is that the immanency of God (plus man's acknowledgment
of this God through repentance) is a profound judgment upon the human situation.
Both the heights and the depths of the world of spirit are
known. The knowledge of the depths within the self saves
from pride, prevents a bitter criticism of the sins of
others and makes a sullen rebellion against the imper-
fections of nature and history impossible; the knowledge
of the heights keeps profound self-knowledge from
degenerating into bitter disillusionment.
Ibid.
The act of repentance, and the acceptance of grace does two things. It makes
real the existence of the immanent God, and it makes possible a profound
analysis of the self. It is the self which acts in history; it is the immanent-
transcendent God which gives meaning to history, and which therefore serves
as the basis for a philosophy of history.
This analytic step from man to God is of fundamental importance in
Niebuhr' s systematic philosophy of history. Until he had explained the meaning
of God for history, he was unable to justify his contention of meaning in_ history.
If he were not able to show meaning in history, his philosophy of history would
have made no sense. Each philosophy of history may utilize a different crutch
by which to give history "meaning. " It may be that "reason" shows history
moving progressively toward some type of millennium on earth, or that
dialectical theology shows that human history is meaningless in its relativity.
In each case a meaning is placed on events within history — even if that meaning
is the fact that "meaning" cannot be understood by man. For such an interpre-
tation has still confronted the problem of meaning in history, and has organized
a philosophy of history based upon its analysis of the problem of history T s
meaning. Niebuhr, in 1934, had clearly shown that he interpreted the meaning
of history by means of the reality of an immanent-transcendent God.
5.
There are, in Reflections on the End of an Era , other chapters valuable
for understanding Niebuhr f s philosophy of history. The opening chapter,
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"The Life and Death of Civilization, TT is concerned with man's inability to
evaluate properly his position in history. Modern man has failed to recognize
the relative nature of his "mechanisms. "
Mechanism easily veils the actual realities of life.
It makes human life seem to be a series of highly
rational social relationships and hides the fact that
these relations are actually the product, not of mind
and conscience but of power and impulse. 151
Modern man does not realize that his "will -to-live" is easily "transmuted"
into "an imperial will-to-power." Man's will-to-live, his effort to escape
mortality, creates the danger of man's attempt to absolutize, by means of
power, his own historical position. The result is that human history becomes
a tangle of power which is driven by impulse. This is a rational process — it
is a mechanism. But the "realities" of human life are that man is unable to
absolutize his own historical era, or his position within that era. He is not
able to fulfill his own destiny in history. The "mechanistic" assumptions of
modern man cast a veil over this reality, for man can only fulfill himself with
the aid of a non -rational resource.
The problem with depending upon reason alone within history is that the
limitations of that device are not fully realized. Its ability to control "impulse"
is overrated by modern man. Reason frequently "provides rationalization
rather than restraints for the play of egoistic impulse." 152 Man's impulses
cannot be totally controlled by reason, because the self issues forth both
reason and impulse. The two are not separate entities but are bonded together
by their common origin in the self.
151Ibid., p. 4.
152 Ibid., p. 5.
Reason is prostituted to self-seeking motives because of man's will
(impulse)
-to-live. A person will "universalize" himself and his own will
-to-
live through the use of reason, and will direct it against those who would pre-
vent him from working his will.
Reason may, in short, result in two conflicting
strategies: the strategy of universalizing a par-
ticular form of life by seeking to subject all
competing forms of itself, and the strategy of
subjecting all particular forms of life to the
universal. Driven to its logical conclusion the
latter strategy ends in the impulse of all high
religion to subordinate every specific form of
life to life in its more absolute form to God.
The unmitigated force of reason is not, therefore, without disastrous conse-
quences in human history. Since reason must of necessity function within the
self, it is subject to the evil tendencies inherent in the self, and occasionally
serves as merely a rationalization for man T s impulse. The converse of this
argument is that since, by observing the facts of history, we detect Instances
where reason served as a rationalization for impulses, we are justified in
assuming that the locus of man's reason (the self) is capable of evil despite
the best intentions of "reason." The suggestion of a systematic argument for
man's original sin is not elaborated in this book, but its importance for
Niebuhr T s philosophy of history is evident from the fact that it casts doubt
upon the ultimate efficacy of reason, and that Niebuhr's philosophy of history
does not utilize reason as a base.
153Ibid.
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Niebuhr's pessimism concerning man's use of reason was not a small
matter. He was convinced that the force of human "impulse 11 in history was
of vast importance. There could be no complete mitigation of man's impulse
through reason. The tension between the forces of reason and of impulse could
not be resolved for they were inherent in the make-up of the self. Within the
self, reason was torn apart by egoistic considerations. The result could not
but be something far less than an impartial force working in history. Either
man would denigrate his own individual rights by over-compensating for his
ego, or he would fail to appreciate the egoistic element involved in any decision
based upon "reason. M The tension could not be resolved.
No stable equilibrium is ever reached in history
between the two impulses: the impulse to subject
the individual or social ego to the universal even to
the point of self-annihilation or absorption and the
impulse to universalize the ego even to the point
of destroying or enslaving all competing forms of
life. ^6
It is significant that the first part of this opening chapter in Reflections
on the End of an Era , in which Niebuhr analyzes "reason," is the first essay
(in his books) in which a strictly logical method of argument is employed. It
is a discourse elevated above most of that found in the earlier Moral Man and
Immoral Society , and in it one can recognize Niebuhr T s concern to make his
philosophy more systematic. The first part of this chapter thus sets the tone
for that writing in the book which deals with philosophy of history.
156
Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 9.
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A major argument of this volume was that there was a sharp distinction
between "spirit 11 and "nature." 157 By this Niebuhr meant that nature (or
reason) could not alone deal with man's problems, and that the "spirit" was
necessary. This is true because the spirit is the source of the ethical force
in life. The spirit should not be rationalized — brought completely into the
realm of nature — because this would dissipate some of its force by allowing
man to imagine that he has gained control over this particular factor. Such
a realization would eliminate the tension within the self and allow man to pride
himself for being in complete control of his destiny.
The results of this, according to Niebuhr, would be disastrous. The
failure to understand that reason would be used to justify impulse "was a fatal
mistake because it permitted a more unrestrained expression of impulse than
ever before in history." Niebuhr concluded with a dynamic (and sometimes
misunderstood attack upon man's supreme faith in reason:
The wise men of our era did not realize at all that
mind is the servant of impulse before it becomes its
master and that the first effect of mind upon impulse
is to make man more deadly in his lusts than the
brute. Impulses always express themselves in well-
defined limits in nature .... But in man reason
bursts the bonds and limits which nature sets upon
her own impulses. Man's higher degree of self-
consciousness and egocentricity transmutes the
brute's will -to -survive into the human will-to-
power. 160
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, p. 9, esp. fn.
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,
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159See Holtan P. Odegard, Sin and Science: Reinhold Niebuhr as Political
Theologian (Yellow Springs, Ohio), passim.
160Reflections on the End of an Era, p. 17-
It should be recognized that Niebuhr wrote this in the heart of the Depression,
and at a time when he felt that a eivilization was reaching its end. Although
this serves to explain a part of the disdain he showed toward man's rational
faculties, a more important fact is that this element of his thought retained a
vital role in his philosophy of history.
6.
The remaining sixteen chapters in Reflections on the End of an Era are
of less importance for Niebuhr's philosophy of history, but are worth consider-
ing, especially since they underscore some of the points already considered.
Perhaps the most consistent strain in this book is the warning given
against a too complete reliance upon reason. Although reason is not identified
with nature, Niebuhr charges that the force of reason is often used to rationalize
the irrational impulses of man's nature. Because of this, Niebuhr can make the
following statement:
Our optimistic rationalists fail to recognize that
the collective enterprises of man belong to the
order of nature much more than to the order of
reason. -^1
The sin of the self, which consisted of the failure to recognize the imperfect
use of reason because of its connection with egoism, is also attributed to, and
more dangerous in, collective man. This argument is the same as that pre-
sented two years earlier in Moral Man and Immoral Society
,
except that Niebuhr
gave it a more systematic statement in Reflections on the End of an Era . The
161Ibid.
,
p. 31.
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theme, however, remained the same:
The wise men who see the logic of history so plainly
always live under the illusion that the men of power
can finally be persuaded to see what they see. They
suffer from this illusion because they do not realize
how much the collective life of man moves by impulse
rather than by reason. 162
Niebuhr saw no justification for the belief that larger communities would bring
"the impulses of nature under an adequate rational and moral scrutiny and
.
avert the deadly vengeance of history upon predatory life." 163 People who
believed this live, he argued,
under the illusion that life, including collective life,
can be made fully rational and moral. They have not
yet seen with what stubborn inertia life-as-impulse
defies the obvious imperatives of life -as -spirit.
Those "imperatives" of spirit included a recognition of human sinfulness,
which would help to solve the blindness of the faith given to reason, and an
acceptance of the immanent God by means of contrition. Other analyses were
bound to fail due to a lack of awareness for the heights and depths of the human
spirit. It was with this confidence that Niebuhr could write that "all purely
moralistic interpretations of history are mistaken. " ^5 Pure moralism could
not account for the failure of reason to solve the problem of history 1 s meaning.
Niebuhr was especially critical of the social sciences, in their attempt
to foster a philosophy of history based upon "reality."
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Sociologists, whose special business it is to study
the realities of social life, seem to be particularly
obtuse in dealing with the profounder and more
tragic aspects of human history. 166
The prejudices of the liberal tradition - optimism, rationalism, and individual-
ism - were made the basis for a philosophy of history which failed TTto do justice
to the doleful realities of human life. M !67 According to Niebuhr, the "real
basis for all of the errors of liberalism /including its philosophy of history/
is its erroneous estimate of human nature. " 168 By this statement he meant
that liberal philosophy of history did not appreciate the egoistic impulses within
the self which result in the corruption of "pure reason, " and thereby define man T s
sin.
It was not only in his discussion of the errors of liberalism that Niebuhr
offered general statements about the nature of history. He could speak of a
"general historical logic" that was not followed due to nationalistic (egoistic)
interference. 169 jje Sp0ke of history as passing "negative judgment upon
predatory life. " 1^0 ne was concerned that evil in history could not be destroyed
because the instruments by which the forces of good destroy evil cannot help but
have transferred to themselves a portion of the evil, thus perpetuating that force
171
in human history.
The problem of good and evil is prominent in Niebuhr' s thought. One
reason for this was his feeling that liberal visions of history did not adequately
understand the permanence of human evil.
166lbid.
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The processes of history are too rough to make a
precise discrimination between good and evil possible.
A civilization which has outlived its usefulness is
destroyed in spite of its virtues. That is what makes
the realities of history so outrageous to moralists and
why they always insist that future history must be more
refined than that of the past.
According to Niebuhr , the liberal-moralistic view could not accept the realities
of history which included the failure of good to win complete victory over evil.
Neither communism nor capitalism understood the "complexities of history"
well enough to justify their "over-simplified abstractions. " ^3 This is pri-
marily simply another way of saying that a philosophy of history must appreciate
both the heights and depths of the human spirit, and must realize that all men
have — and always will have — the capacity for both good and evil. This
"adequate view of human nature" and of man's place in history was possible
only in a religion which did not bow before reason (or modern society's
1 74-
"mechanism") . ^
The co-existence of good and evil in history was a constantly stressed
point in this book, and all of those which followed.
The moral logic of history is never pure and
dispassionate precisely because judgment upon
evil cannot be executed without stiffening the spirit
of justice with an alloy of the spirit of vengeance. 175
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Although the "executors of judgment in history" mix "the hope for a city of
God" with their more lustful and egoistic activities, progress "toward the
higher good" is made upon "very tortuous routes and ... the dreams of the
ideal are sometimes cruelly disappointed." 176 From this analysis, it is
obvious that "history never moves, even to its inevitable goals, on a straight
177
line. " Further, it is evident that man is most inhuman when he denies the
dictum that good is suffused with evil, and "imagines his natural impulses and
his relative values to be the instruments of some absolute good. " 178 Man is
most cruel when he is unaware of his cruelty, and this is the case when he
assumes that he foresees a "straight line" through history, and thus absolutizes
his own relative position in history. This "yearning after the absolute" was a
"weakness of the human imagination" that, according to Niebuhr, would con-
tinue throughout human history. 179 This kind of pessimism was generally
tempered, however, with expressions of hope.
When the hard realities of history have once again
dissipated the Utopian dreams of the present the
emphasis of classical religion upon the experience
of grace will find its way back again into the moral
and religious life of the race. 180
The above passage amply demonstrates the nature of Reinhold Niebuhr
T
s
philosophy of history as it had developed in 1934. Theological terminology and
176Reflections on the End of an Era , p. 140.
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symbolism had replaced the rational schema of "liberal" and "philosophical"
interpretations of history. Another significant point is that Niebuhr was as
much preoccupied with criticizing other philosophies of history as he was with
building one of his own. This trait remained with him even in the most system-
atic presentations of his own philosophy of history in Human Destiny and Faith
and History. It is, therefore, perhaps fair to view Niebuhr T s philosophy of
history as a product of his struggle against the "errors" of the modern era.
The fact that his first systematic treatment of the problem of meaning in history
appeared in £ book of "reflections on the end of an era" is revealing. Witness-
ing the "end of an era" dedicated to one philosophy of history, Niebuhr felt
impelled to search for a "new" one.
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VI
THE MIDDLE 1930 T S (PART 2)
In 1935 Reinhold Niebuhr published a book entitled An Interpretation of
Christian Ethic s. ±ox Although by 1956 he reported that he was neither able to
defend nor interested in defending his position in An Interpretation of Christian
Ethics, 182 the book is an important work if only for the fact that ethics have
been, and continue to be, one of Niebuhr T s prime concerns. The subtitle for
Moral Man and Immoral Society was "A Study in Ethics and Politics," and
this attempt to combine political action with ethical judgment remained for
Niebuhr a valid function for religion.
An Interpretation of Christian Ethics does not, however, contribute
significantly to Niebuhr T s philosophy of history. What it does discuss had
already been elaborated in greater detail in Reflections on the End of an Era .
An example of this is the comments concerning the transcendency and imma-
nency of God. 183 He discussed the corruption of the mythical symbols by a
single-minded belief in a transcendent God. This was the result of an attempt
181Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York, 1935;
Cleveland, 1956).
182Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, eds. , Reinhold Niebuhr , o£. eit
pp. 434-435.
183An Interpretation of Christian Ethics , pp. 18-20.
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to rationalize the symbols. 184 He praised the catastrophic aspect of the Marxian
philosophy of history, but criticized its utopianism. 18 5 Niebuhr spoke of
Judeo-Christian religion (prophetic religion), and its ability to maintain the
tension between the real and the ideal, with the ideal transcending "every
historical fact and reality. "
Niebuhr did, in An Interpretation of Christian Ethics
,
introduce the
"myth of creation" into his philosophy of history: 187
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187This paper has not emphasized systematically Niebuhr T s treatment of
"myth." Rudolf Bultmann T s work on New Testament "mythology" is
better known than that of Niebuhr. However, the latter does not wholly
accept Bultmann's interpretation. (For a comparison of Bultmann's
and Niebuhr T s interpretation of myth see Hans Hoffmann, The Theology
of Reinhold Niebuhr, op . cit.
, pp. 68-88.) This subject is expansive —
especially as related to philosophy of history. Of special value is
Niebuhr T s article, "The Truth in Myths," in The Nature of Religious
Experience: Essays in Honor of Douglas Clyde Macintosh (New York,
1937). See also Macintosh's attack upon Niebuhr T s interpretation of
myth, in which he traces Niebuhr T s enchantment with mythology from
Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic
.
("Is Theology Reducible
to Mythology?" The Review of Religion , 4 /January, 19407, 140-158.)
Niebuhr T s reply is in The Review of Religion , 4 (March, 1940), 304-308;
and Macintosh T s rejoinder was published in May, 1940, pages 434-437.
Edward J, Carnell also traces Niebuhr 1 s appreciation of myth to the
Leaves From the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic . (The Theology of
Reinhold Niebuhr /Grand Rapids, 1950/, p. 113, note 42.)
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The myth of creation offers
. . .
the firm foundation
for a world view which sees the Transcendent involved
in, but not identified with, the process of history. It
is important to realize that the myth of creation is
only the basis of this dialectic and that its further
elaboration results in the prophetic or apocalyptic
characteristic of this religion, marked by its hope
for an ultimate fulfillment of meaning and its faith
that the God who is the ground of existence is also
the guarantor of its fulfillment. 188
But there are no significant additions in this passage to those thoughts found in
Reflections on the End of an Era . It is important, however, that Niebuhr was
eager to emphasize the fact that he proposed a "genuinely prophetic religion."
Prophetism defines much of his philosophy of history. In a prophetic religion,
"redemption is never, as in rational and mystical religion, above the realm of
living history, but within and at the end of it. n 189 Two years later, in Beyond
Tragedy, the problem of redemption within, at the end of, or "beyond" history
was to receive systematic discussion. 90 a suggestion of this was given in
1935 when Niebuhr stated that "the eschatology of Jesus, though this-worldly
in framework, went beyond the possibilities of natural existence. " 191
«-
This "clue" to a deepening consideration in Niebuhr T s philosophy of
history received some further expression in this book. Niebuhr related the
"meaninglessness of life" to a "faith in the final unity." The "final unity"
l88An Interpretation of Christian Ethics , p. 29
189Ibid.
,
p. 35.
190See Beyond Trage dy, chapter 1, esp. p. 22.
191An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 37
transcended the "world's chaos," yet was "basic to the world's order." 192
This is nothing more than a restatement of the transcendency and immanency
of God. But we may read such statements in the light of Niebuhr's interest
in eschatology, for the nature of God forms the basis for the interpretation of
history's end. The relationships between the dual nature of God on the one
hand, and the culmination of history on the other, can be followed in this
passage:
Placing the final fulfillment at the end of time and
N
not in the realm above temporality is to remain true
to the genius of prophetic religion and to state
mythologically what cannot be stated rationally. If
stated rationally the world is divided between the
temporal and the eternal and only the eternal forms
above the flux of temporality have significance. 19 3
The case for the immanency of God is here placed in the context of the end of
history. This end is not to be "above temporality, " but is to be a genuine
apocalypse. The importance of an immanent God is powerfully evident now:
if history culminates within itself, and God is merely transcendent, then
redemption is impossible. Prophetic religion understands this and states the
"reality" mythologically, whereas rational interpretations fail to see the con-
nection between the apocalypse and the "rationally absurd" immanent God.
The logic of Niebuhr's argument must be accepted if we are to under-
stand why he places the source of history's meaning beyond history. The
immanence of God operates within history, but it is the transcendence of God
192ibid.
,
p. 44.
193
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which gives history meaning. The first point that must be granted is, as
Gordon Harland has written, that to "ask the question of the meaning of his-
tory is to ask the question of the fend T of history." 194 C. C. McCown has
reacted sharply to Niebuhr T s belief that the meaning of history is transcendent,
that it is "beyond history." McCown believes that "the value and meaning of
history are to be sought and found within history. " 195 However, if we agree
that we cannot know the meaning of history until the end of history, we must
also accept the corollary that meaning cannot be found within history because
that would imply that history has not truly "ended. " The force of "common
sense" may assure us that McCown is correct, but Niebuhr's logic asks us to
look for a meaning which is beyond hi story T s relativities, i.e. , for a transcend-
ent meaning.
We should not forget that much of what we call "absurd" and "irrational"
is nothing more than Niebuhr's sense of paradox. It is a paradox that a God can
be both transcendent and immanent, and that history can both end and be re-
deemed. A classic example of Niebuhr T s use of paradox is the possibility of
something which is impossible.
The apocalypse is a mythical expression of the
impossible possibility under which all human life
stands. The Kingdom of God is always at hand in
the sense that impossibilities are really possible,
and lead to new actualities in given moments of
194Gordon Harland, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York, 1960), p. 95.
195C. C. McCown, "In History or Beyond History, " The Harvard Theological
Review
,
38 (July, 1945), 175.
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history. Nevertheless every actuality of history
reveals itself, after the event, as only an approxi-
mation of the ideal; the Kingdom of God is therefore
not here. It is in fact always coming but never
here. 196
Although this passage appears paradoxical — if not unintelligible — the paradox
is one which Niebuhr would accept as true. The important fact here is that
Niebuhr has attempted to show that a myth can be true. Historical illusions
do not destroy the truth of the myth. For example, the lack of historical truth
in the story of the fall of man does not destroy the truth contained in the myth
of the fall ol man. 197
In a chapter entitled "The Christian Conception of Sin, " Niebuhr showed
the way in which the myth of the fall is an adequate expression of the nature of
man. This is important because Niebuhr's acceptance of man's sin controlled
the shape of his philosophy of history.
Niebuhr felt that the myth of the Fall effectively explained the nature of
human evil. According to this myth, "evil came into the world through human
responsibility." 198 Evjj js therefore attributed — in prophetic religion — to
man's "evil will, " since it was man who introduced evil into the world. 199 It
196An Interpretation of Christian Ethics
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p. 60.
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was not "the limitations of natural man" that resulted in human evil, but
rather the free choice of man, which resulted in the initiation of evil. The
Fall expressed this because it made man the active agent in the myth — man
of his own will caused his fall. Thus, evil is something inherent in the self,
rather than the result of man's environment-produced limitations. Man will
not purge his life of evil by eliminating those instruments by which he imagines
evil to originate — ignorance, slums, weaponry.
The more man attempts to eliminate evil, the more deeply involved
he becomes in absolutizing "partial and finite values." Man cannot eliminate
evil because it is embedded in his own self. This is why man cannot fulfill his
own history, for he is unable to overcome his inability to perfect his life.
The organizing center of life and history must
transcend life and history, since everything
which appears in time and history is too partial and
incomplete to be its center. But man is destined,
both by the imperfection of his knowledge and by his
desire to overcome his finiteness, to make absolute
claims for his partial and finite values. He tries,
in short, to make himself God. 200
By attempting to overcome his own finiteness and his own evil, man imagines
himself capable of becoming God. At the very least, man's striving toward
perfection is in the image of God, for it is axiomatic that God is perfect. This
attempt by man results in a jealous God. 201 The myth of the Fall explains the
fact of God f s jealousy due to "the human rebellion against the divine. " This
20QIbid.
,
p. 82.
201For an elaboration of the idea of a "jealous God," see Beyond Tragedy ,
pp. 27-28.
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interpretation of the Fall, according to Niebuhr, is "a revelation of a tragic
reality of life, " and "is attested by every page of human history . " 202
Niebuhr has used the myth of the Fall to support his interpretation of
human nature and human history. The myth cannot be rationalized into a posi-
tion in history, for it is a product of supra-history
.
203
It is wrong "to reduce
its /i.e., mythical religion's/ supra-history to actual history." For when
this is done
the myth of creation is constructed into an actual
history of origins when it is really a description of
the quality of existence. The myth of the Fall is
made into an account of the origin of evil, when it
is really a description of its nature. 204
Thus the myth of the Fall is a "true myth" because it accurately describes the
human situation.
The reality of this situation is one in which the importance of inevitable
human evil — or "original sin" — is emphasized.
The conclusion most abhorrent to the modern mood
is that the possibilities of evil grow with the possi-
bilities of good, and that human history is therefore
not so much a chronicle of the progressive victory
of good over evil, of cosmos over chaos, as the
story of an ever increasing cosmos, creating ever
increasing possibilities of chaos. 2 °5
An Interpretation of Christian Ethics
, pp. 83-84.
203C. C. McCown has failed to realize that the Fall represents an "eternal myth"
in Niebuhr's theology, and it can therefore be accepted as "true" at the same
time that evolution is granted. It is true, as McCown writes, that Niebuhr
has introduced a "surd" into his philosophy of history, but that is not harmful
to a philosophy built upon paradox. ("In History or Beyond History, " op. cit. ,
159-160.)
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, pp B 85-86.
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,
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The perfect allusion for this dilemma is one which Niebuhr has used frequently —
that of Scylla and Charybdis. The nature of man assures that his destiny cannot
be fulfilled by himself. Man, by his energy and wisdom, is able to create much
good, but not without accumulating evil; and he is able to build his cosmos, but
not without threatening its existence with even greater chaos.
The "nature and destiny of man" are thus inevitably connected. Man's
nature — observed through the pages of history, and illustrated through such
Biblical myths as the Fall — demonstrates that he is incapable of fulfilling his
destiny. He cannot provide his history with meaning 0 That function must be
left to a force which is beyond man and beyond history.
Man recognizes the possibility for the eternal:
Man as a creature of both finitude and the eternal
cannot escape his problem simply by disavowing
the ultimate. 2°6
Man is a creature of history, yet he is unique:
Man is the only mortal animal who knows that he is
mortal, a fact which proves that in some sense he is
not mortal. Man is the only creature imbedded in the
flux of finitude who knows that this is his fate; which
proves that in some sense this is not his fate. u<
2Q6
Ibid.
,
p. 68.
207Ibid., p. 67.
83
Niebuhr was willing to let the paradox expressed in the above passage stand
as an expression of truth. 208 It is from this type of paradox that he developed
his philosophy of history.
_3.
It is accurate to designate, as does Herbert Muller, paradox to be for
Niebuhr the "essence of history." 208 The element of paradox in Niebuhr T s
philosophy of history is found in prominent use in his first book in 1927, Does
Civilization* Need Religion?
. Seven years later Niebuhr began to systematically
construct a philosophy of history in several chapters of Reflections on the End
of an Era. Both here, and in An Interpretation of Christian Ethics in 1935,
paradox was the Pandora T s Box from which flew the various arguments of Niebuhr's
philosophy of history. The first chapter of Beyond Tragedy was entitled "As
Deceivers, Yet True." The paradox contained in this first chapter title is per-
haps symbolic of the fact that Beyond Tragedy was Niebuhr 1 s first book devoted
primarily to philosophy of history.
The most virulent attack upon Niebuhr j s conception of the "truth" has been
made by Holtan P. Odegard, in Sin and Science: Reinhold Niebuhr as
Political Theologian (Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1956). The following passage
is typical of the tone of Odegard 1 s book: "History has become, in the hands
of Niebuhr, a place or state where man can create progress — and yet where
he cannot, because progress is also dependent upon divine intervention.
History has become a haunt filled with mystery in which human problems
cannot be solved by men. " (p. 64) It greatly bothers Odegard that man should
live in a mystery -filled "haunt."
^^^Herbei"t J. Muller, The Uses of the Past: Profiles of Former Societies
(New York, 1952; Mentor Edition)
,
p. 389.
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N. P. Jacobson no doubt believed that the following comments could
be offered as trenchant criticism of Niebuhr T s use of paradox rather than
"reason. 11
The obscurantism of our author /Niebuhr/ might
provide a complete study of its own. His love for
paradox can be seen at work elevating absurdities
to some more worthy level. Human reason suffers
in this treatment, and the force of Niebuhr' s entire
* work is weakened. For if human reason at once
provides the only means of communicating meaning
and on the other hand cannot be trusted, we are left
in a blind alley, indeed. Of course, Niebuhr has
no intention of destroying the credibility of reason
* any farther than is necessary to discredit opposing
views. 2
The whole point of Niebuhr's work is that a philosophy of history cannot be based
upon reason. It is true that human reason is a valid means of communication,
but that is not the same as saying that human reason is the foundation of mean-
ing. One will feel Niebuhr T s work weakened by this argument only if one
believes that reason, rather than paradox, offers a more profound appraisal
of human history.
Paradox was not the only element of his full interpretation of history
that received early expression. A careful study of Beyond Tragedy , The Nature
and Destiny of Man , and Faith and History , in conjunction with an examination of
his earlier publications, reveals the fact that before the publication of these later
three works, Niebuhr had — at the least — intimated all of his major ideas on
history. Original sin, as it formed the basis for man's inability to independently
210
N. P. Jacobson, "Niebuhr 1 s Philosophy of History, " The Harvard Theological
Review, 37 (October, 1944), 260.
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provide his history with meaning, was well entrenched in Niebuhr T s theology
by the early 1930 T s. The supernatural force in the form of an immanent-
transcendent God, which provided human history with its meaning, was already
elaborately defined in Reflections on the End of an Era . The actual "meaning"
of man T s history was certainly not explained as adequately as it was in Human
211Destiny
,
but Niebuhr did show great concern to rescue history from mean-
inglessness — whether it be the "false meaning" of liberalism or the "transcend-
ent meaning" of dialectical theology.
Niebuhr 1 s early writing does not offer a systematic statement of his
.
philosophy of history, but it does contribute to our understanding of Niebuhr's
thought an awareness of the development which made possible the writing of the
more well-known later books. It is true that one can gain a sense of Niebuhr T s
philosophy of history by studying Human Destiny or Faith and History. It is also
true that one would not be fully aware of Niebuhr T s philosophy of history by
merely surveying his early writing. The great synthetic works that a man pro-
duces after many years spent discovering and refining his own ideas are surely
the most accessible avenues to his thought.
However, to know only these masterpieces is somewhat like appreciating
an iceberg only for its exposed tip, and forgetting its massive base. A man's
thought cannot be profoundly understood if one merely skims off the "finished"
ideas and neglects the development which produced them. The tangle of ideas
211See Human Destiny
,
pp. 287-321.
from which Reinhold Niebuhr T s philosophy of history developed illuminates
that vision in a way which the finished philosophy taken alone cannot accomplish.
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